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As  the  financial 
crisis  continues 
into its third year, 
it is time to con-
sider  the  lasting 
impact it may have 
on  our  society. 
Will we see a drift 
towards  more 
government-led  economic  activity,  a 
tendency  towards  the  rolling  back  of 
markets  and  private  enterprise?  As  a 
recent debate at a CFS-Luncheon suc-
cinctly  asked:  how  much  instability  is 
capitalism able to bear? Discussions in 
the public arena have begun increasingly 
to question the political fundament of 
our  market  economy.  In  contrast  to 
earlier  economic  crises,  an  impressive 
joint course of action among all major 
governments  has  been  initiated.  The 
G-20 meetings set the pace, creating a 
high  level  of  expectations  around  the 
world. By and large, governments,   
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➾the European Commission, and central
banks have lived up to these expecta-
tions.  Will  this  continue?  When  the 
crisis is over, and we review the actions 
taken  to  fight  it,  will  we  still  have  a 
strong and innovative financial industry? 
In  his  seminal  book  on  Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy, first published 
in 1942, Joseph Schumpeter argues that 
despite  all  its  achievements  in  terms 
of  efficiency  and  innovation,  private, 
entrepreneurial industry will eventually 
relinquish control to the guided hand of 
socialist planning. A weakening of market 
powers via government intervention will 
smooth  business  cycles  associated  with 
the imbalances and instabilities perceived 
to  be  inherent  to  capitalist  market 
economies. If enterprises become large 
and manager-run, rather than owner-run, 
the rise of public ownership will appa-
rently  have  no  dramatic  consequences 
on  innovation  and  efficiency.  While 
Schumpeter’s analysis leaves many issues 
unresolved, including, for example, the 
issue  of  corporate  governance  in  large 
firms,  the  role  of  small  and  medium 
industry,  and  the  potential  of  firms  to 
remain innovative and efficient, he never-
theless proves to be accurate in predicting 
an  increased  role  for  government  in 
volatile and – with hindsight – systemic 
industries such as that of banking. 
Macroeconomists  would  describe  the 
current crisis as an extreme shock to the 
economy  that  forces  firms  and  house-
holds  to  adjust  their  plans  downward. 
Nevertheless, the devastating impact of 
instability  emanating  from  a  crisis  is 
cushioned in many ways, shifting much 
of the burden over time. This cushioning 
includes, amongst other things, not only 
short-time work for entire industries and 
a higher level of unemployment benefits, 
but also a counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
(the ‘stimulus’), and a benign monetary 
policy (the ‘easing’). 
There  is,  however,  a  second  form  of 
instability  that  has  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  market-driven  instabilities 
just described. It is that of crisis-related 
policy  instability,  pertaining  to  the 
basic governance rules of our so-called 
‘capitalist’  system.  Today’s  economic 
system  must,  in  fact,  be  regarded  as 
a  mixture  of  capitalist  and  socialist 
elements,  if  the  extensive  role  of 
publicly-owned  firms  and  institutions, 
particularly in services and banking, is 
considered. The fundamental question, 
therefore,  remains:  do  the  remedies 
offered  by  policy-makers  to  fight  the 
financial crisis comply with the ground 
rules  of  our  economic  system?  The 
respect  for  private  property  plays  an 
important, defining role with respect to 
these basic tenets. The frequently voiced 
critique  of  an  accommodating  public 
policy  that  accepts  the  socialization  of 
losses, while permitting private owners’ 
entitlement  to  accruing  profit,  is  that 
it  –  if  shown  to  be  true  –  will  be  a 
strong, politically destabilizing factor in 
a market economy. 
The current situation in Germany, with 
large amounts of public money earmarked 
for intervention in faltering markets and 
firms, challenges the fundamental rules 
of the economic system – and erodes the 
common understanding that an inherent 
component  of  private  ownership  is 
indeed  the  potential  to  risk  of  losing 
everything,  in  exchange  for  retaining 
the decision rights and an entitlement to 
residual profits. 
The  rise  in  interventionist  policy-
making, ranging from the taking over 
of toxic assets in the banking industry 
to  the  engineering  of  corporate 
restructuring in the car industry, or in 
other  industries,  is  highly  alarming.  It 
is likely to frustrate structural changes, 
which  are  badly  needed  in  order  to 
defend  tomorrow’s  competitiveness  of 
these industries. 
Current  public  economic  policy  is, 
therefore,  structurally  conservative, 
and is likely to impose large losses on 
society  as  a  whole  in  the  longer  run. 
In  the  interest  of  long-term  welfare, 
government  money  should  be  strictly 
limited  to  fighting  systemic  risks  in 
banking.  And  even  then,  government 
money  should  not  be  used  to  prevent 
restructuring, and a change of owner-
ship  and  control  at  the  firm  level.  In 
this sense, a consistent ‘capitalist’ public 
policy towards systemic risks will respect 
private ownership – and insist on wiping 
out equity before taking over losses.
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The Macroeconomic Model Data Base 
A New Comparative Approach to Macroeconomic 
Modeling and Policy Analysis
The Macro Model Data Base project is 
part of the EU-sponsored joint initiative 
on  “Modelling  and  Implementation 
of  Optimal  Fiscal  and  Monetary 
Policy  Algorithms  in  Multi-Country 
Econometric Models” (MONFISPOL). 
This initiative is supported by a three-
year  funding  through  the  Seventh 
Framework  Programme  for  Research 
(FP7)  of  the  European  Commission’s 
Socio-economic Sciences and Humani-
ties (SSH) Program.
The  MONFISPOL  projects  focus  on 
the  evaluation  of  macroeconomic 
policy,  specifically  the  analysis  of 
optimal fiscal and monetary policy. This 
includes  the  development  of  optimal 
policy  models  to  analyze  the  strategic 
interactions  between  monetary  policy 
and fiscal policies in a monetary union, 
the analysis of the dynamics of public 
debt, as well as the construction of the 
Macro  Model  Data  Base,  a  data  base 
of  macroeconomic  models  that  allows 
for  systematic  models  comparison.  In 
addition,  new  numerical  tools  will  be 
developed and implemented in Dynare, 
a  public  domain  platform  for  the 
simulation  and  estimation  of  dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models.
The partners collaborating in this joint 
initiative  are  Michel  Juillard  (Centre 
pour  la  Recherche  Economique  et  ses 
Applications,  Paris),  Joseph  Pearlman 
(London  Metropolitan  University), 
Paul  Levine  (University  of  Surrey), 
Albert  Marcet  (Consejo  Superior  de 
Investigaciones  Científicas,  Madrid), 
Volker  Wieland  (Center  for  Financial 
Studies  at  the  Goethe  University  of 
Frankfurt),  and  Riccardo  Girardi 
(European Commission – Joint Research 
Centre).
The  Macro  Model  Data 
Base  project  headed  by 
Volker  Wieland  and 
carried out at CFS aims 
for building an archive of 
macroeconomic  models 
based  on  a  common 
computational  platform 
and  providing  various 
tools  for  systematic 
model  comparison. 
While  in  the  past  such 
comparison  projects 
have  been  infrequent 
and costly initiatives, the 
Macro Model Data Base 
provides a new approach 
that  enables  individual 
researchers  to  conduct 
model  comparisons  easily,  frequently, 
at low cost and on a large scale. The 
broad range of macroeconomic models 
incorporated  in  the  first  version  of 
the  Macro  Model  Data  Base  include 
some  fairly  small  models  that  focus 
on  explaining  output,  inflation  and 
interest rate dynamics such as the New 
Keynesian  models  of  Clarida  et  al. 
(1999)  and  Rotemberg  and  Woodford 
(1997),  many  medium  scale  models 
covering key economic aggregates like 
Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) and 
Christiano,  Eichenbaum  and  Evans 
(2005),  and  some  fairly  large  models 
like John Taylor’s (1993) model of the 
G7  economies.  Researchers  can  easily 
include new models in the data base and 
compare the effects of novel extensions 
to established benchmarks.
The first version of the Macro Model 
Data Base will be made available in the 
course  of  this  year,  so  that  users  can 
then employ the archive for their own 
research or policy analysis projects.
A  detailed  introduction  to  the  new 
comparative approach facilitated by the 
Macro Model Data Base can be found in 
Wieland, Cwik, Müller, Schmidt, and 
Wolters (2009).4
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Two  recent  papers  by  Taylor  and 
Wieland  (2009)  and  Cogan,  Cwik, 
Taylor, and Wieland (2009) employ this 
new  approach  to  model  comparison. 
Taylor and Wieland (2009) look at three 
monetary  models,  used  to  evaluate 
monetary policy in the U.S. economy 
and  contained  in  the  Macro  Model 
Data  Base  to  compare  the  monetary 
transmission  process  of  these  models 
and evaluate the robustness of optimal 
policy rules. Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and 
Wieland (2009) examine the robustness 
of models currently used in practice to 
evaluate fiscal policy stimulus proposals 
in  the  U.S.  with  a  particular  focus 
on  the  implied  government  spending 
multipliers.
Sebastian Schmidt and Volker Wieland (CFS) 
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RICAFE 2 
The Project and Its Policy Implications
The  Regional  Comparative  Advantage 
and Knowledge-Based Entrepreneurship 
(RICAFE  2)  Research  program  was 
launched  on  1  March  2006.  Over  a 
three-year period, the program result-
ed  in  intensive  research  interactions 
among  the  researchers  involved.  The 
program  led  on  from  the  successful 
RICAFE  project  completed  in  April 
2005. Under RICAFE 2, the original 
network of RICAFE was expanded to 
include  new  European  partners  from 
Amsterdam, Latvia, and Lugano as well 
as research institutions from India and 
Israel. Overall, the CFS team working 
on  entrepreneurial  finance  played  a 
very active role not only with respect 
to  research,  but  also  regarding  the 
exchange of researchers. The European 
Commission, DG-Research, has acted 
as sponsor of RICAFE 2. The network 
has  conducted  research  into  the  eco-
nomics of the risk capital financing of 
innovative  companies  and  has  offered 
informed and insightful research advice 
to the Commission. The results were 
presented  at  RICAFE  2  conferences 
in  London  (2006),  Riga  (2007),  and 
Amsterdam (2008).
The project’s key objective was to look 
at how the various European models of 
social,  legal,  and  economic  institutions 
affect the patterns of regional economic 
growth. Furthermore, it aimed to analyze 
how  knowledge-based  entrepreneurship 
(KBE) contributes to shifting patterns of 
regional comparative advantage, and how 
it shapes policy options and priorities. In 
addition to the analysis of the economic 
factors behind these questions, the project 
aimed to discuss policy implications and 
propose new policies.
Our  research  enabled  a  better 
understanding  of  the  entrepreneurial 
process  in  various  important  ways 
that  can  be  divided  into  two  distinct 
overarching  topics.  The  first  theme 
explored  the  interplay  between  social, 
legal  and  economic  factors,  making 
use  of  scientific  findings  from  the 
fields  of  economics,  psychology,  and 
sociology.  The  second  theme  analyzed 
the  link  between  knowledge-based 
entrepreneurship and regional dynamics 
with  respect  to  economic  activity  as 5
well as regional structural change. For 
this  we  looked  at  the  experience  of 
knowledge-based  entrepreneurship  not 
only  in  Western  Europe  but  also  in 
accession  countries,  as  well  as  in  the 
three fast growing emerging economies 
Israel,  India,  and  Brazil.  Our  research 
on entrepreneurship gave rise to several 
interesting policy implications.
Motivations for initiating 
entrepreneurial activities and 
promoting innovation
The first set of policy implications pertain 
to the psychological aspects of entrepre-
neurial initiatives. Earnings alone cannot 
explain why individuals start their own 
businesses,  especially  given  the  lower 
(average)  earnings  derived  from  entre-
preneurial activities or self-employment. 
We  showed  how  over-confidence,  risk 
aversion, social capital and networks can 
explain this puzzle and the existence of 
regional  disparity  in  knowledge-based 
entrepreneurship.
While  entrepreneurs  tend  to  be  over-
optimistic, it is also true that in order to 
become an entrepreneur, many of them 
must leave a well-paid executive job, and 
may be reluctant to do so. Palomino and 
Peyrache  (RICAFE  2  WP38)  showed 
that  offering  a  job-back  guarantee  can 
strictly increase the incentive of potential 
entrepreneurs  to  invest  in  generating 
ideas. Consequently, job-back-guarantees 
can have a positive effect on the efficiency 
of labor markets and can also enhance 
social  welfare,  whenever  the  project 
entails large positive spillover effects for 
the rest of society.
Social  capital  and  social  networks 
may  also  have  important  effects  on 
capital  allocation.  Evidence  from 
Dutch  companies  has  suggested  that 
education is a key element for successful 
entrepreneurship. Parker and van Praag 
(RICAFE 2 WP 33) provided quantitative 
estimates of the effect of human capital 
on  entrepreneurial  performance.  In 
addition,  the  empirical  evidence  shows 
that capital allocation seems to be driven 
by favoritism and connections rather than 
by market mechanisms and information 
on future expected returns. 
How financing aspects 
can promote entrepreneurial 
activities
In  the  political  arena,  the  financing 
constraints  of  entrepreneurial  activity 
are  often  considered  to  be  most 
important.  Katrin  Tinn  (RICAFE  2 
WP48) challenged the traditional view 
that  the  role  of  financial  markets  is 
confined solely to financing innovations. 
Her  analysis  suggested  that  financial 
markets  can  stimulate  adoption  of 
technological  innovation  by  providing 
exit  opportunities  to  entrepreneurs 
and  venture  capitalists  investing  in 
technology.  This  analysis  has  some 
interesting implications for policymakers 
in the new member states. An important 
result  is  that  policymakers  should  not 
strive  to  ensure  full  transparency  to 
investors,  even  if  they  are  capable  of 
doing so. 
Organizational aspects 
of innovative companies 
Large  and  small  companies  differ   
markedly in their ability to spawn entre-
preneurial activity. Over the years small 
companies  have  become  able  to  gener-
ate more innovative activity in the U.S. 
because of a relaxation of the liquidity 
constraints in the 1990s. This suggests 
that  the  deepening  of  financial  struc-
tures  in  Europe  should  encourage  this 
source of entrepreneurship and help to 
overcome the risk-aversion that prevents 
individuals from working for riskier, but 
more innovative start-ups.
Innovative  firms  rely  greatly  on  the 
quality of intellectual property (IP) rights 
and corporate regulations to help build 
successful companies and improve their 
performance.  In  terms  of  promoting 
innovation, Llobet and Suarez (RICAFE 
2  WP52)  showed  that  IP  rights  are  a 
double-edged  sword:  they  prolong  the 
expected  duration  of  the  monopoly 
position  of  successful  innovators, 
but  they  also  increase  the  hurdle  for 
success.  Strikingly,  Llobet  and  Suarez 
found that the protection of incumbents 
against future innovators has an overall 
negative  effect  on  innovation.  In  other 
words,  the  (negative)  effect  channeled 
through the entry hurdle dominates the 
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(positive)  effect  on  post-entry  profits. 
The results crucially depend on whether 
entrepreneurs  have  access  to  venture 
capital.
Another important policy implication is 
that  IP  protection  against  imitation  is 
not  unambiguously  a  good  thing.  This 
is  contrary  to  conventional  wisdom, 
which ignores the effect of imitation on 
competition and maintains that imitation 
essentially dilutes profits from innovation 
and, therefore, discourages it. 
All in all, the protection against imitation 
(or against entrants in general) should be 
lower when the access to funding is easier. 
This  has  implications  for  the  optimal 
system of protection of IP and explains 
how it should be adapted according to 
the severity of financial constraints. IP 
policy that fits a given industry, region 
and time period might need to change as 
institutions for entrepreneurial financing 
develop: in effect, if financial constraints 
are  relaxed,  then  IP  protection  should 
diminish.
Location choice of 
high-tech firms in intra-
metropolitan areas
The  development  of  technological 
innovation  depends  mainly  on  a 
production environment that encourages 
a high level of local innovation and the 
synergy  of  different  factors  to  create 
regional  competitive  advantages.  An 
innovative  production  environment 
reduces the uncertainty and risk that a 
firm might face in the process of being 
innovative.
In RICAFE 2 WP61, Frenkel examined 
the  considerations  of  high-tech  firms 
when  choosing  a  location  within  a 
metropolitan  region.  He  studied 
competition  among  intra-metropolitan 
locations for attracting high-tech firms in 
the Tel-Aviv metropolitan region.
The  findings  suggest  that  differences 
between  zones  are  associated  not  with 
their distance from the metropolis’ core, 
but with advantages found in the local and 
metropolitan  environment.  The  results 
indicate that a location’s attractiveness is 
of the utmost importance to small firms 
that rely on a skilled labor force and on 
R&D activities. This finding is important, 
since  small  firms  are  usually  less  well 
established and more sensitive to costs. 
Nevertheless, he found that the relatively 
high costs resulting from local taxes do 
not necessarily harm the attractiveness of 
employment  zones.  Small,  R&D  active 
plants prefer to locate in an environment 
that  supplies  supportive  infrastructure, 
including a strong human capital pool, 
supporting networks, and technological 
innovativeness.
Government policy 
and knowledge-based 
entrepreneurship
A lot of government activity is directed 
towards entrepreneurial activity. There-
fore, the role of tax policy is decisive: 
can  tax  policy  foster  the  creation  of 
new companies? To answer this question, 
Da  Rin,  Di  Giacomo  and  Sembenelli 
assembled  a  novel  country-industry 
level panel database with entry data of 
European  companies  between  1997 
and  2004  (RICAFE  2  WP53).  They 
computed effective tax rates and explored 
the effect of corporate taxation policy on 
entry rates.
The results imply that corporate taxation 
has  an  effect  on  entry  rates  that  is 
statistically significant and economically 
relevant.  Two  results  stand  out.  They 
found that the effect of a tax reduction is at 
work only below a given initial threshold 
tax level. The effect is economically non-
negligible. For example, a reduction of 
the corporate tax rate from the median 
(30.08%) to the first quartile (27.57%) 
implies a 0.880 percentage point increase 
in the entry rate. Interestingly, they also 
found that a reduction in corporate tax 
rates is more effective in countries with 
a  better  institutional  infrastructure,  as 
measured  by  the  quality  of  accounting 
standards. This suggests that a reduction 
in the corporate tax rate would stimulate 
the  creation  of  companies  in  countries 
where it is more difficult to hide profits by 
manipulating the profit and loss accounts.
Steffen Juranek and Uwe Walz (CFS)
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At  CFS,  Program  Director  Uwe 
Walz is in charge of this network; 
Steffen Juranek is supporting him 
as a research assistant. 
References
WP  33  Simon  Parker  and  Mirjam  van 
Praag,  “Schooling,  Capital  Constraints 
and  Entrepreneurial  Performance:  The 
Endogenous Triangle”.
WP 38 Frédéric Palomino and Eloic-anil 
Peyrache, “Job-Back Guarantees”.
WP 48 Katrin Tinn, “Technology adoption 
with exit in imperfectly informed equity 
markets”.
WP 52 Gerard Llobet and Javier Suarez, 
“Financially  Constrained  Innovation, 
Patent  Protection,  and  Industry 
Dynamics”.
WP 53 Marco Da Rin, Marina Di Giacomo 
and  Alessandro  Sembenelli,  “Firm  entry 
dynamics  and  the  taxation  of  corporate 
profits: Evidence from firm-level data”.
WP  61  Amnon  Frenkel,  “The  Intra-
Metropolitan  Competition  for  Attracting 
High-Tech Firms”.
→   All papers are available on 
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/RICAFE/7
CFS Financial Center Index | Research and Policy
CFS Financial Center Index continues to fall
Project Team: Christian Knoll & Corinna Wolf (CFS)
*   A value of 100 represents a neutral business climate of the German financial center. 
By construction the index ranges between a maximum of 150 and a minimum of 50.
The latest CFS Financial Center Index 
survey,  which  was  conducted  during 
the first and second quarter of 2009, 
shows a continuing negative trend. The 
index value currently stands at 97.3 and 
is  1.5  points  lower  than  the  previous 
index  value  of  98.8.  This  time  the 
continuing decline reflects the negative 
business  sentiment  registered  in  the 
group of financial sector service provi-
ders, particularly in the accounting and 
consulting business. This group’s rather 
pessimistic view is mainly determined 
by  negative  profit  expectations  and 
planned  staff  reductions.  The  other 
core  group  of  financial  institutions, 
insurances and brokerage firms, has a 
more cautiously optimistic view of their 
profit and job situation. “While finan-
cial institutions in Germany apparently 
succeed  in  overcoming  the  financial 
crisis  by  means  of  drastic  restructu-
rings, the financial service providers are 
now being hit by the crisis with a half 
year delay”, explained CFS Director Jan 
Pieter Krahnen.
Special Survey
The  special  survey  conducted  this 
time dealt with the effects of the G20 
meeting in London on 2 April 2009. It 
also focused on the German financial 
market  authorities  and  the  stability 
of  the  German  financial  system.  The 
majority  of  participants  in  the  survey 
rate  the  measures  taken  at  the  G20 
meeting  positively.  However,  there 
is  no  clear  view  on  whether  these 
measures will be successful in bringing 
back  investor  confidence.  Regulating 
rating agencies and hedge funds are seen 
as effective measures to prevent future 
The German Federal GovernmenT plans To Take a more prevenTive sTance in Financial 
supervision and To increase The naTional supervisory auThoriTies’ power To acT.  
supporT For The FollowinG measures:
Qualification requirements for members of supervisory boards
Banks only 71%
Full panel excl. banks 67%
Stricter capital requirements
Banks only 52%
Full panel excl. banks 69%
Competence to control business models of banks
Banks only 48%
Full panel excl. banks 55%
do you believe ThaT The FollowinG measures will be eFFecTive in prevenTinG 
FuTure Financial crises? (1: noT eFFecTive – 5: very eFFecTive)
Regulating rating agencies
Banks only 3,5
Full panel excl. banks 3,9
Regulating hedge funds
Banks only 3,5
Full panel excl. banks 3,6
Reducing the procyclicality of the financial system
Banks only 3,2
Full panel excl. banks 3,1
Compiling a risk map
Banks only 2,7
Full panel excl. banks 2,8
Introducing a global credit register
Banks only 2,5
Full panel excl. banks 2,9
The CFS Financial Center Index is a quarterly index measuring the evaluation 
and  expectations  of  financial  market  agents  for  Germany  as  a  financial 
center. The index is based on surveys of leading executives from the financial 
community in Frankfurt and Munich. The maximum attainable index value is 
150, the minimum index value 50. An index value of 100 indicates a neutral 
business sentiment.8
crises.  The  respondents  also  endorse 
the  strengthening  of  financial  market 
supervision. Krahnen sees this as a clear 
demand  by  the  finance  industry  for 
more regulation, not only with respect 
to  measures  that  are  directed  towards 
short-term crisis management, but also 
regarding preventative measures.
Germany as a financial center has gained 
credence. Two thirds of the interviewees 
believe that the German financial system 
is more stable than other financial centers, 
thanks to its regulatory framework, the 
German universal banking system, and 
its  three-pillar  structure.  The  future 
prospects of Germany as an important 
financial center are growing constantly. 
“It  is  conceivable  that  the  expected 
increase in regulation will have a positive 
effect on Germany as a financial center”, 
said Krahnen.
Research and Policy | CFS Financial Center Index
→   Further details can be found at www.financialcenterindex.com 
Towards a New Financial Order
The work by the Issing Committee
How  can  financial  stability  be  restored  and  how  should  the  international  financial  markets  be  more 
efficiently  regulated  and  supervised  to  prevent  severe  financial  crises  in  the  future?  To  answer  these 
questions, expert groups in various countries have been entrusted with finding long-term solutions for 
an enhanced supervisory and regulatory framework. Otmar Issing, President of the Center for Financial 
Studies, and Jan Pieter Krahnen, CFS Director, were appointed to the Expert Commission to advise the 
German government on financial crisis prevention. Through these appointments, the Center for Financial 
Studies has started to broaden its core activities towards providing advice to policymakers.
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Origins of the crisis
What  by  mid-2007  appeared  to  be  a 
defined problem in a special segment of 
the U.S. mortgage market, notably the 
U.S.-subprime market, in the meantime 
has grown into an unprecedented global 
financial  crisis  and  one  of  the  worst 
recessions in modern times. As the crisis 
unfolds, it becomes more and more clear 
that  the  problems  we  observe  are  the 
consequences  of  a  dynamic  interaction 
between  factors  in  the  macro  and  the 
micro side of the economy. At the root 
of  the  crisis  had  been  a  combination 
of  massive  liquidity  and  low  interest 
rates,  which  led  to  sharp  increases  in 
asset  prices,  especially  in  the  housing 
sector  of  many  countries.  In  an  envi-
ronment  of  inadequate  regulation  and 
important gaps in supervisory oversight, 
inappropriate  incentive  structures  have 
promoted short-termism and encouraged 
the production of complex financial in-
struments. Supported by high degrees of 
leverage, the overall situation in booming 
financial markets became more and more 
unsustainable. It needed only a trigger 
to  collapse.  This  trigger  was  delivered 
when  house  prices  in  the  U.S.  started 
to  fall  with  the  expectation  that  this 
would continue for an extended period 
of time. While academics, policy makers 
and  market  participants  still  come  to 
terms with what has happened, political 
leaders around the world are challenged 9
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to  solve  the  most  pressing  problems. 
Meanwhile, initial steps have been made 
to lay the foundations for a post crisis 
financial order.
Reactions to the spread of the 
financial crisis
When  the  financial  crisis  accelerated 
quickly  after  the  collapse  of  Lehman 
Brothers  in  September  2008, 
policymakers around the world reacted 
with  a  twofold  strategy:  In  order  to 
stabilize  the  financial  system,  they 
immediately  set  up  deposit  guarantee 
schemes and developed plans to support 
the banking sector. Simultaneously, they 
called into action expert commissions to 
prepare proposals for long-term reforms 
of the international financial system.
In  October  2008,  Chancellor  Angela 
Merkel  called  upon  Otmar  Issing  and 
Jan Krahnen to join an expert commis-
sion to advise the government on issues 
relating to financial crisis prevention and 
financial market reform. While heading 
this national expert commission, Issing 
was also a member of a group of experts 
for  the  reform  of  financial  markets  in 
Europe set up by the President of the 
European  Commission  and  headed  by 
Jacques  de  Larosière.  Together  with 
their  colleagues  in  the  national  expert 
commission  Jörg  Asmussen  (Finance 
Ministry), Klaus Regling (formerly Eu-
ropean  Commission),  Jens  Weidmann 
(Federal  Chancellery),  and  William 
White (formerly Bank for International 
Settlements), Issing and Krahnen were 
to consider different options for funda-
mentally reforming the world’s financial 
architecture in order to prevent a repeat 
of the current crisis.
Commensurate with this goal, the Issing 
Committee’s task was to explore alternative 
ways for increasing the efficiency of the 
regulatory  and  supervisory  framework 
in  order  to  improve  crisis  prevention 
in  financial  markets.  The  commission 
started with an elaborate analysis of the 
causes  of  the  current  crisis  to  detect 
shortcomings in existing arrangements. 
At  the  core  of  their  recommendations 
was  the  idea  that  supervision  has  to 
focus also on systemic risk rather than 
only  on  risk  for  individual  institutions 
and market participants, and that early 
warning signals need to be backed up 
by reliable information on all financial 
market segments.
In order to voice their suggestions at the 
international  stage,  the  Expert  Com-
mission  prepared  two  reports  for  the 
international summits that followed the 
outbreak of the crisis, in particular the 
G20 meetings in Washington in Novem-
ber 2008 and in London in April 2009 
along with a number of smaller summits 
at the EU level.
Recommendations by the 
Issing Committee
On 2 February 2009, about one month 
before  the  London  Summit,  Chancel-
lor  Angela  Merkel,  Finance  Minister 
Peer  Steinbrück  and  the  members  of 
the Issing Committee met in Berlin to 
present  to  the  public  the  final  recom-
mendations of the experts. One of the 
novel ideas the experts had brought to 
Berlin received particular attention: The 
Issing Committee proposed to establish 
a detailed database on risk exposures by 
the financial sector. This project went by 
the telling title “Global Risk Map” owing 
to the fact that the proposed database 
could be used to visualize the amount 
and location of risks within the global 
financial system. The Risk Map would 
be designed to help shed light on the net 
exposures and interdependencies of indi-
vidual institutions and make transparent 
the major risk factors behind them. A 
database  of  this  kind,  in  combination 
with the right explorative tools, could 
thus serve as an effective instrument to 
alert  policy  makers  of  rising  systemic 
risk. Ultimately, the Risk Map project 
involved collecting new data to fill cur-
rent blind spots; such as off-balance sheet 
entities  as  well  as  credit  risk  transfer 
instruments. As an integral part of the 
Risk  Map  project,  a  centralized  and 
harmonized  ‘Global  Credit  Register’ 
should  be  introduced.  The  group  em-
phasized that additional data would have 
to be collected systematically and with 
its ultimate use in mind – a concept the 
experts readily subsumed under the label 
of “intelligent transparency”.
The  Issing  Committee  furthermore 
recommended  that  the  measure  of 
Meeting at the Chancellery in Berlin on 28 October 2008 - Krahnen, Issing, Merkel, Regling, Steinbrück10
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G20 summit on financial markets and world economy in London. 
Lloyds Banking Group bail-out / 150 GBP bill. to heal UK economy / Drop in DJIA and S&P500 comparable to Great Depression.
Crisis spreads to Eastern Europe / American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of $787 billion is signed.
Blue Monday Crash / Government of Iceland collapses / Obama suggests federal spending bill of almost $1 trillion.
Madoff ponzi scheme scandal erupts / Unemployment rate rises / NBER announces that USA is already 1 year in recession.
G20 summit in Washington / US government rescues Citigroup / China creates stimulus plan.
US Senate passes $700 billion bail-out / FED, ECB, central banks in England, China, Canada, Sweden and Switzerland cut rates / Large 
losses in financial markets and job cuts worldwide/Bank deposits are guaranteed in Germany, Denmark, UK, Australia and New Zealand 
/ EU leader meetings in Paris, later in Brussels/Germany, France and Italy with individual plans / G7 summit in Washington / Oil price falls 
to $80 per barrel / ”Black Friday” on financial markets / Hungarian central bank gets injection from ECB.
US Treasury nationalizes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac / Lehman Brothers files bankruptcy / Stock market downturn / Central banks inject 
billions in money markets / Merrill Lynch is acquired by Bank of America / AIG Corp is bailed-out by FED / Job losses worldwide / Partial 
nationalization of Fortis, Dexia and Glitnir / Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs turn to traditional banks.
Commerzbank takes over Dresdner Kleinwort.
Major banks report losses related to investments in mbs / Oil price peaks at $147/ barrel.
Deutsche Bank reports loss of $3.9 billion in the first quarter of the year.
Bear Stearns collapses and is acquired by JP Morgan Chase.
Nationalization of the UK bank Northern Rock.
Stock market downturn / Service Industry Index collapses to recession levels / Consumer confidence loss / FED cuts 125 bp.
US banking reserves go negative.
UBS, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch announce big losses.
DJIA, S&P500 and Nasdaq records.
Liquidity crisis emerges. FED cuts 50 bp. Credit rating agencies downgrade many mbs.
Bear Stearns Hedge Fund collapses.
Subprime industry collapses. Value of US subprime mortgage estimated to be $1.3 trillion.
Growth of housing market is halted abruptly. Yield curve is flat compared to the year before.
Maximum inflation of US housing bubble. Large amounts of mortgage-backed securities (mbs) are issued. US subprime mortgages 
increase by 292%. 
FED decreases interest rate to 45 year low: 1%.
systemic risk derived from the Risk Map 
be linked to suitable policy action, e.g. 
bank capital requirements. Under such a 
regime, capital requirements would need 
to rise during periods of high systemic risk 
and fall when threats to the system are 
declining. Ideally, such a rule would help 
to lower the so-called procyclicality of 
the financial system, i.e. the (unintended) 
tendency of banks to enhance the ups and 
downs  of  the  financial  cycle,  which  is 
another important issue addressed by the 
expert group.
High  on  the  government’s  agenda, 
the  Issing  Committee  made  detailed 
proposals as to how non-banks, such as 
hedge funds and rating agencies, should 
be  regulated.  With  regard  to  rating 
agencies, the group proposed to enhance 
competition  between  rating  providers 
instead of regulating the rating process 
itself. Towards this end, rating agencies 
would have to register and provide data 
on rating migrations and rating defaults 
to  a  central  oversight  body.  The  data 
would then be used to assess predictive 
performance of rating agencies, leaving 
it to the investors to make best use of 
the  information  provided.  Concerning 
hedge  funds,  the  Issing  Committee 
recommended a dual approach. On the 
one hand, hedge funds should be obliged 
to register with a central oversight body 
as part of the Risk Map project. On the 
other hand, hedge fund activity should 
be  monitored  indirectly  through  the 
major  banks  that  provide  credit  and 
services to the funds, which would be 
possible with the risk map encompassing 11
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approach. The experts argued, that such 
a  dual  approach  made  it  much  more 
difficult for a fund to escape the radar 
of global surveillance altogether, while 
at the same time allowing to view the 
consolidated  exposure  of  the  financial 
system vis-à-vis hedge funds.
Current outcomes and the 
road ahead
What have been the results of the G20 
meetings? Are we now better prepared 
to avoid the repetition of a crisis as severe 
as the current one?
Towards  improvement  of  the  global 
institu  tional  frame  work,  the  Issing 
Committee recommended strengthening 
the  role  of  the  FSF  and  expanding  its 
membership  to  a  broader  base.  This 
point was taken up also by the London 
summit, where leaders from the Group 
of  Twenty  pledged  to  establish  a  new 
Financial Stability Board (FSB). The new 
board would be a strengthened successor 
to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) 
including  all  G20  countries,  FSF 
members,  Spain,  and  the  European 
Commission.
In  addition,  the  G20  Group  recom-
mended  strengthening  the  role  of  the 
IMF  in  international  surveillance  of 
systemic risk, a point also made by the 
Issing Committee. In particular, the IMF 
should have more resources and play a 
broader role in the world economy than 
in the past. The G20 also expects the 
IMF  to  ensure  the  “even-handed  and 
independent  surveillance  of  economies 
and their banks as well as of the impact 
of their policies on others and of risks 
facing the global economy”.
While many proposals are still on the 
way, the next meeting of the G20 has 
already  been  scheduled.  In  September 
2009, world leaders will meet in New 
York  to  assess  whether  the  promises 
made  in  London  have  been  kept.  The 
meeting  will  also  assess  the  progress 
made  in  implementing  the  range  of 
financial regulatory reforms set in train 
at the G20 meeting in Washington. The 
Issing Committee, too, will continue its 
work on these issues.
Christian Weistroffer & Julia LeBlanc (CFS)
Washington Summit, 14-15 November 2008
•   Consideration of the causes of the crisis.
•   Agreement on common principles for reforming the financial system, 
e.g. improving transparency and accountability of financial markets and 
institutions, strengthening regulation, and reducing procyclicality of the 
financial system.
•   Clear commitment to the principles of a free market economy.
London Summit, 2 April 2009
•   Attempt to restore confidence, growth, and jobs by making available an 
additional $5 trillion in total fiscal stimulus packages.
•   Establishment of a new Financial Stability Board (FSB) with a strengthened 
mandate, as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).
•   Strengthening of the IMF in its role as an independent surveyor and 
mandate  to  provide  early  warnings  of  macroeconomic  and  financial 
risks. 
•   Pledge to extend regulation and oversight to all systemically important 
financial institutions, instruments and markets, including hedge funds 
and rating agencies. 
•   Pledge to take action against non-cooperative jurisdictions, including 
tax havens. 
New York City Summit, September 2009
Roadmap to a New Financial Order
CFS White Papers
The Recommendations by the Issing Committee can be found on our website 
www.ifk-cfs.de
New Financial Order
Otmar Issing, Jörg Asmussen, Jan Pieter Krahnen, Klaus Regling, Jens 
Weidmann, William White 12
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CFS Colloquium
The 46th edition of our publication series “Beiträge zum CFS Colloquium” is now available. This volume 
contains contributions of the five speakers at the 2007 Colloquium Series “Banks and Exchanges in Flux: The 
next Great Challenge?” and is devoted to the effects of technological change on the organization of banks 
and on product development. All contributions are in German and have a short English summary at the end.
46 46
Funktionswandel von 
Banken und Börsen: 
Die neue Herausforderung? 
Banks and Exchanges in Flux: 
The next great Challenge?
Beiträge zum CFS Colloquium
ISBN 978-3-8314-2617-1
Der technologische Wandel – hin zu einer zunehmend elektronischen Sammlung 
und Verarbeitung von Informationen – bedingt letztlich einen tief greifenden 
Funktionswandel von Banken und Börsen. Der Einsatz automatisierter Analyse-
verfahren (etwa im Kreditgeschäft), vollelektronischer Handelsplätze (etwa die 
Plattform Archipelago) und Handelsstrategien (etwa beim algorithmic trading) 
sowie die modellbasierte Bewertung von Finanzinstrumenten (etwa die Black-
Scholes-Verfahren für Derivate) gewinnen stetig an Bedeutung. Damit wird die 
traditionelle Bündelung von Aktivitäten in Banken und Börsen in Frage gestellt. 
Die Wertschöpfungskette der Finanzindustrie – von der Einwerbung von Einlagen-
geldern, über die Produktgestaltung und -vertrieb, bis hin zu Risikomanagement 
und Anlageberatung – wird aufgebrochen und teilweise neu gegliedert. Es stellt 
sich die Frage, welche der einzelnen Prozessschritte einem neuen Marktwett-
bewerb ausgesetzt sind und welche Glieder der Wertschöpfungskette in einem 
einzelnen Unternehmen zusammengefasst werden sollen.
Dieser Frage gingen die Redner der Vortragsreihe des CFS Colloquiums im Jahr 
2007 quer durch die Finanzindustrie nach. Führende Persönlichkeiten aus Banken, 
Börsen und Finanzdienstleistern legten ihre Einschätzungen des Funktionswan-
dels in der Finanzindustrie dar und zeigten zukünftige Entwicklungschancen und 
-risiken auf. In diesem Band sind die Beiträge der fünf Redner gesammelt.
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Central Banks, Liquidity Traps and Solvency Traps 
6 May 2009
A speech by Prof. Willem H. Buiter
On 6 May 2009, Willem H. Buiter, Professor of European Political Economy at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science gave a presentation on “Central Banks, Liquidity Traps and Solvency Traps”. His was the 
first speech of the new CFS Colloquium Series “Redefining accountability: Lessons from the recent financial 
crisis”.
In  his  introduction,  Thomas  Laubach  (Goethe  University) 
acknowledged  Willem  Buiter  as  one  of  the  most  qualified 
observers and commentators on the current crisis and especially 
on policy responses to the crisis. Laubach reminded the audience 
of  Buiter’s  contribution  to  the  Jackson  Hole  Symposium, 
organized last August by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City. In his analysis of the responses of the Federal Reserve, the 
European Central Bank and the Bank of England during the first 
year of the crisis, Buiter controversially claimed that the Federal 
Reserve, and to a lesser extent the other central banks as well, 
had succumbed to what he called “cognitive regulatory capture”. 
Instead of acting effectively as regulator of the financial sector, 
Buiter perceived the Fed’s position as too close to financial 
markets and leading financial institutions, and too responsive to 
their special pleadings.
After  the  introductory  remarks,  Buiter  began  his  talk  by 
postulating  that  the  zero  lower  bound  of  interest  rates  was 
merely the assumption that the short, risk-free nominal interest 
rate  cannot  be  negative.  In  reality,  he  argued,  there  is  no 
theoretical or practical reason for not having a negative interest 
rate if that was what a Taylor rule, used as a guide to official 
policy rate by central banks, suggested. According to Buiter, 
the main problem with setting (negative) nominal rates was the 
presence of “bearer instruments”. “Bearer instruments”, such as 
currency, are anonymous, and are transferable to another party 
without a requirement for countersignature.
In contrast to bearer instruments, the identity of the owner 
of “registered” securities, such as shares or bank accounts and 
reserves held by banks with the central bank, is known. As a 
result of this, paying interest, negative or positive, on registered 
instruments is trivial. In many cases today, interest payments 
are entries in electronic ledgers that have no technical obstacles 
to negative rates. Central banks, Buiter argued, could easily 
charge  negative  interest  rates  on  deposits  (reserves)  held  by 
banks with them.
However, interest payments on currency (positive or negative) 
are more difficult because of the anonymity of the owner. The 
bearer instrument has to be clearly marked as ‘current’ on 
interest to determine whether interest has been settled.
Having  stated  the  problems  connected  to  currency,  Buiter 
went on to describe three ways to implement negative nominal 
interest rates and remove the zero lower bound on short, risk-
free nominal interest rates.
Willem H. Buiter is Professor of European Political Economy, London 
School  of  Economics  and  Political  Science.  He  received  his  Ph.D. 
from Yale in 1975. During the first 22 years of his career, he was a 
professor at Princeton, Bristol, the London School of Economics, Yale 
and Cambridge. His publication record is admirable and his range of 
research interests is extensive, from monetary policy and monetary 
institutions, pension funds and social security to public finance, for 
example issues of fiscal federalism.
Besides  these  academic  credentials,  Buiter  also  has  substantial 
experience as policy maker. He served for three years as an external 
member  on  the  Bank  of  England’s  Monetary  Policy  Committee. 
From  2000  until  2005  he  served  as  Chief  Economist  and  Special 
Counselor to the President of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development.
Since 2005, Professor Buiter has returned to academia and has been 
intensely involved in the analysis and policy discussions of the financial 
crisis. 
Willem H. Buiter14
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Abolish currency
From a technical point of view, the abolishment of currency 
should pose no problem, as countries can nowadays switch 
easily to electronic and bank-account-based means of payment 
and exchange. ‘E-money’ that can pay positive or negative 
interest without any additional cost is now widely available in 
the advanced (post-) industrial world. Given that traditional 
bank accounts, credit cards and debit cards can take care of 
most of the retail payments, currency can be made redundant 
as a means of payment for legitimate transactions. In Buiter’s 
opinion, the main drawbacks of abolishing currency – loss of 
anonymity and of seigniorage income by central banks – do 
not weight against the advantage of not having a zero lower 
bound constraint on nominal interest rates. Besides, currency 
encourages tax evasion, money laundering, and criminality 
and large denominations pose social costs.
In  his  opinion,  it  would  be  enough  to  leave  only  low 
denominations of currency. The carry costs (safe-keeping, 
insurance and storage) for large amounts of cash would likely 
become prohibitive.
Tax currency and ‘stamp’ it to show it is 
‘current on interest due’
This  proposal,  originally  voiced  by  Gesell  was  supported 
by Irving Fisher. The idea behind this proposal is that when 
the interest rate on currency is positive, the currency must 
be marked (by stamping or clipping coupons) to make sure 
the (anonymous) bearer does not present it repeatedly for 
the payment of interest. When the interest rate is negative, 
one  could  verify  whether  it  is  current  on  interest  using 
inspections of the instrument. This approach however would 
be administratively costly and unpleasantly intrusive.
Unbundle currency 
from the unit of account
The third way to allow for negative nominal interest rates 
goes back to Eisler (1932). His solution is to decouple the 
numéraire from the “cash” currency. 
To  clarify  this  idea  for  the  euro  zone,  Buiter  invited  the 
audience to assume that a new currency, the “wim” 1, would 
be introduced and that the euro would be kept as numéraire 
(i.e. for bank accounts, government contracts, bank reserves 
with the central bank and government debt). The government 
would set the exchange rate over time between the euro and 
the wim instrument to ensure absence of arbitrage. Since the 
wim is the currency, there is a zero lower bound on its interest 
rate. However, the euro nominal interest rate could become 
negative.
In the following technical part of his speech, Buiter presented 
the  decoupling  of  the  numéraire  and  the  currency  in  a 
dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. In 
the  model  economy,  a  no-arbitrage  condition  implies  that 
the spot exchange rate between the euro and the wim, the 
forward exchange rate between the euro and the wim and the 
one period interest rate on safe euro securities and the one-
period interest rate on safe wim securities are related through 
covered interest parity (CIP), i.e. the ratio of the interest 
rates is equal to the ratio of the exchange rates.
If  the  monetary  authority  followed  a  Taylor  rule  that 
determined  both  interest  rates  to  go  below  zero,  the wim 
interest rate would be constrained to be non-negative and 
therefore would equal zero. However, the euro interest rate 
could be set at whatever negative value the Taylor rule called 
for,  and  this  without  creating  an  arbitrage  opportunity, 
provided that the difference in the forward price and the spot 
price is captured exactly by the differences in the interest 
rates.
Hence, the zero lower bound on euro interest rates would be 
removed and replaced by a zero lower bound on wim interest 
rates. By the law of one price, real interest rates (inflation 
corrected interest rates) would still be the same.
Buiter  addressed  potential  problems  in  this  economy  if 
the euro would cease to be the numéraire for key private 
contracts  (especially  wage  and  price  contracts).  If  the 
numéraire would start to follow the currency, and the wim 
price level would become the price level that matters, the 
economy would be back at its start, simply having renamed 
Willem H. Buiter
1 Name chosen in memory of Wim Duisenberg, the first President of the European Central Bank.15
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its  currency.  To  counter  these  problems,  Buiter  claimed 
that  authorities  should  strongly  encourage  the  use  of  the 
numéraire, for example by insisting that all contracts in and 
with the public sector are denominated in euro or requiring 
that tax returns are made in euro.
Buiter summed up the advantages of this third scenario where 
currency and numéraire are unbundled. The abolishment of 
currency would no longer be necessary and removing the 
zero lower bound on euro interest rates would increase the 
effectiveness of monetary policy.
Having shown three ways to overcome the zero lower bound, 
Buiter pointed out that central banks continue to ignore these 
solutions. Instead of removing the zero lower bound, central 
banks engage in quantitative easing by purchasing government 
securities  of  all  maturities  when  they  are  at  their  lower 
bound. This can put the central bank into a strong liquidity 
trap  in  which  it  can  only  use  money-financed  tax-cuts  or 
transfer  payment  increases.  As  a  result,  the  central  bank 
would be either acting as a fiscal principal in its own right or 
as a fiscal agent for the government. Buiter claimed that this 
proposal could work only if increases in the monetary base 
are expected never to be reversed in the future. The problem 
of  this  strategy  would  be  the  default  risk,  especially  in  a 
currency unit like the euro zone and the absence of a ‘fiscal 
Europe’. The lack of fiscal indemnity could pose a threat to 
the ECB’s independence when losses incur due to defaults in 
monetary policy operations, liquidity enhancing and credit 
enhancing operations.
Another  option  the  central  bank  could  choose  would  be 
credit easing. In this case, Buiter asserted that central banks 
would  also  need  a  full  fiscal  indemnity  for  capital  losses 
due to defaults on assets the central bank becomes exposed 
to  through  outright  purchases  of  private  securities  and 
unsecured  lending  to  the  private  sector.  They  would  also 
need this indemnity when engaging in collateralized lending 
to the private sector when the collateral consists of private 
securities.
Concluding his presentation, Buiter emphasized that removing 
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates would mean 
a valuable addition to the policy arsenal of central banks. 
Keeping the zero lower bound, he said, is a costly mistake.
Julia LeBlanc (CFS)
Otmar Issing
6 May 2009
Central Banks, Liquidity Traps and Solvency Traps
Prof. Willem H. Buiter 
(Chair of European Political Economy, European Institute, 
London School of Economics and Political Science)
27 May 2009
Should Monetary Policy “Lean or Clean”: That is the Question?
William R. White 
(Former Economic Adviser, Head of Monetary and Economic 
Department, Bank for International Settlements)
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Management der Finanzmarktkrise aus der Sicht eines CFO
Dr. Eric Strutz (Management Board Member, Commerzbank AG)
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Reform der globalen Finanzstruktur
Dr. Hugo Bänziger (Management Board Member, 
Deutsche Bank AG)
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Do we need more regulation?
Prof. Eddy Wymeersch 
(Chairman, Committee of European Securities Regulators)
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CFS Presidential Lecture
Europe – Cultural Identity – Cultural Diversity
16 March 2009
Jean-Claude Trichet
Trichet began his speech by expressing 
his gratitude for the invitation from his 
former colleague Issing, with whom he 
has often exchanged views on cultural 
issues such as literature and poetry. He 
said he also welcomed the opportunity 
to point out that the ECB values Europe’s 
cultural diversity as a major asset and 
actively  seeks  to  raise  awareness  for 
the essential contribution this diversity 
makes  to  Europe’s  cultural  identity. 
Furthermore,  he  sees  the  invitation 
as  a  chance  to  voice  his  conviction 
that  indeed  money  and  culture  have 
more  similarities  than  is  generally 
understood:  poems  for  example,  like 
gold coins, are meant to last and retain 
their  integrity.  They  both  represent 
a “store of value” over the long term 
and both belong to the people in a very 
deep-rooted sense. 
The search for a central 
concept in Europe’s cultural 
identity
One  way  of  shedding  light  on  the 
cultural identity of Europe is to search 
for a central concept, the ‘essence’ of 
Europe, which would simultaneously be 
both its source and summary. Trichet 
gave two references that are particularly 
enlightening in this respect: the vision 
of Paul Valéry, the poet and essayist, 
and  that  of  Edmund  Husserl,  the 
philosopher.
“Partout où les noms de César, de Gaius, de 
Trajan  et  de  Virgile,  partout  où  les  noms 
de Moïse et de St Paul, partout où les noms 
d’Aristote, de Platon et d’Euclide ont eu une 
signification et une autorité simultanées, Là 
est l’Europe.” Paul Valéry, L’Européen, 1924
Paul  Valéry  emphasizing  the  spiritual 
character  of  Europe  writes  that  “the 
people  of  Europe  are  not  defined  by 
race, nor by language or customs, but 
by  desires  and  breadth  of  will  (…)”. 
Valéry  sees  the  cultural  identity  of 
Europe as an expansion of the union, 
achieved  under  the  Roman  Empire, 
brought about by a con  fluence of Greek 
thought, Roman law and, the impact of 
the Bible.
Husserl for his part views that the origin 
of the spiritual idea of Europe lies in 
Greece, where a handful of men initiated 
a radical conversion of all cultural life 
in  their  own  nation  and  among  their 
neighbors.  In  a  famous  lecture  given 
in  1935,  he  concludes  with  visionary 
perception that “Europe’s crisis has its 
roots  in  a  mistaken  rationalism”  and 
that “this crisis of European existence 
can only end, either in the ruin of a 
Europe alienated from its rational sense 
of life or in the rebirth of Europe from 
the spirit of philosophy.”1
→   The full text of the speech can be found on the ECB website. A link is also available on the 
CFS website: www.ifk-cfs.de .
Jean-Claude Trichet
1 Die Philosophie in der Krisis der europäischen Menschheit, public lecture in Vienna for the Wiener Kulturbund, May 1935 
On 16 March 2009, the Center for Financial Studies welcomed ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet to give 
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Europe’s cultural identity, about the diversity within Europe and about Europe’s aspirations towards univer-
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Trichet  pointed  out  the  importance 
of  returning  to  the  sources  of  the 
“spiritual form of Europe” in order to 
understand  the  powerful  threads  of 
Europe’s  cultural  identity  across  two 
millennia.  He  likened  this  cultural 
identity  to  a  tightly  woven  fabric,  in 
which strong national cultures – each 
with  its  own  identity  and  origin  – 
are  interwoven  with  transnational, 
reciprocal influences.
The remarkable network 
of transfrontier cultural 
admiration and influence
There are many good cases throughout 
history of cross-border cultural admira-
tion and exchange between cultures 
and languages. Trichet illustrated 
this with some striking examples 
including that of Goethe, who 
expressed  a  strong  admira-
tion  for  Shakespeare  in  his 
autobiography  “Dichtung 
und  Wahrheit”.  Goethe  also 
translated work from Voltaire 
and  Diderot  and  contributed 
greatly thereby to their promi-
nence  in  Germany.  Goethe’s 
own influence on other cultures is 
also extraordinary. He had many great 
admirers  including  even  the  likes  of 
Napoléon Bonaparte.
Trichet  cited  Dante  Alighieri,  the 
13th century poet and philosopher and 
author  of  “The  Divine  Comedy”  as  a 
further good example. His far-reaching 
influence  is  found  down  the  ages 
throughout Europe, for example in the 
work of Proust and that of contemporary 
writers,  such  as  the  Albanian  author 
Ismail Kadare. And Dante himself also 
drew  from  other  European  sources. 
His  “terza  rima”  has  its  roots  in  an 
old  lyric  form  in  Provençal  dialect 
known as “sirventès”. Furthermore, the 
historian, Frances Yates has commented 
that Dante himself was influenced by 
the “Art of Memory” and its founder, 
the  Greek  poet  Simonides  of  Ceos, 
who lived in the 5th century B.C. It is 
from  this  same  Greek  poet  that  the 
notion of the poem as an “indestructible 
monument” originally stems. 
In  explaining  how  Simonides’  and 
Dante’s  work  still  touch  Europe’s 
cultural  collection  today,  Trichet  also 
provided  evidence  to  support  the 
argument that the “cultural fabric” of 
Europe extends over 25 centuries. And 
quoting  the  writer,  Cees  Noteboom2, 
Trichet stressed that it is precisely this 
immense cultural endowment, with all 
its diversity, that gives Europeans their 
European identity. Europeans share the 
same basic cultural sources, regardless 
of  the  fact  that  they  may  come  from 
vastly differing backgrounds.
The cultural activities of the 
European Central Bank
Trichet  also  spoke  about  the  cultural 
activities undertaken by the ECB with 
a view to raising greater awareness for 
the cultural wealth of Europe.
Once  a  year,  an  exhibition  is  held 
in  the  ECB  headquarters,  providing 
insights  into  the  contemporary  art 
scene  of  a  Member  State  of  the  EU. 
These exhibitions also give the ECB the 
opportunity to purchase works of art 
for its own collection, which currently 
comprises 170 works by 75 artists.
Since 2003, the ECB has also organized 
the “Cultural Days of the ECB”, each 
year  inviting  a  different  Member 
State of the EU to organize a series of 
cultural events in cooperation with the 
national central bank. Later this year, 
the Romanian Cultural Days will take 
place in Frankfurt.
The aspiration of European 
culture to universality
Trichet  asked  whether  Euro-
pean culture has a fundamental 
characteristic  that  makes  it 
unique  among  the  world’s 
cultures.
Referring  to  the  French 
philosopher,  Jacques  Derrida, 
Trichet  expressed  Europe’s 
aspiration to be universal: “To feel 
European among other things, does it 
mean being more, or less, European? 
Both,  without  doubt.” 3  Precisely 
because Europe has been gradually built 
on the basis of a profound recognition 
of its cultural diversity, does it aspire 
to be universal. Its cultural unity does 
not  imply  confinement,  introspection 
or isolation inside a cultural ‘fortress’. 
An  integral  part  of  its  culture  is  its 
admiration  and  insatiable  curiosity 
about the abundance of cultures beyond 
its shores. This deep-seated aspiration 
to  universality  is  also  expressed  by 
Husserl in his Vienna lecture, when he 
talks about “a spirit of free criticism” 
and “the infinite ideals for the spreading 
‘synthesis’ of nations”.
2 De ontvoering van Europa, “If I am European (…) this surely means that Europe’s multiculturalism profoundly influences my Dutch identity”. 
3 Derrida, L’autre Cap18
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Trichet also looked at how this diversity 
and universality applies to the European 
Central  Bank.  Diversity  is  reflected 
in  the  fact  that  27  nationalities  are 
represented  within  the  ECB  and  in 
the  setup  of  the  Eurosystem,  which 
consists of the ECB and the 16 euro area 
national central banks. Universality is 
also aspired to by the ECB through its 
support  of  multilateral  contact  with 
institutions  on  other  continents.  The 
ECB  aims  to  play  an  active  role  in 
all  the  international  financial  institu-
tions and international informal groups 
to  which  it  belongs.  Last  but  by  no 
means  least,  Trichet  emphasized  the 
importance  of  the  ECB’s  role  as  the 
guardian  of  Europe’s  single  currency 
under the Maastricht Treaty. Economic 
and Monetary Union form the basis of 
Europe’s  prosperity  and  stability  and 
the  single  currency  is  an  emblem  of 
Europe’s unity. 
Trichet  concluded  his  speech  with  a 
pledge  to  continue  to  offer  the  euro 
as  a  unique  and  irreplaceable  anchor 
of  stability  and  trust.  In  the  present 
very difficult circumstances, it is more 
important  than  ever  that  Europe  can 
rely on this anchor.
Issing thanked Trichet for his valuable 
contribution  and  recapitulated  that 
“diversity is a strength and not a weak-
ness in Europe.”
A  lively  discussion  with  the  audience 
followed.  Themes  such  as  cultural 
exchange,  European  achievements  in 
integration, business ethics and unified 
challenges  in  Europe  came  up  for 
discussion  with  valuable  contributions 
from  amongst  others  Volker  Wieland 
(Goethe University Frankfurt and CFS) 
and Rolf-E. Breuer (Deutsche Bank AG 
and Chairman Managing Board CFS).
Lut De Moor (CFS)
Otmar Issing and Jean-Claude Trichet Breuer, Weder di Mauro and Krahnen
Jan Pieter Krahnen, Jean-Claude Trichet and Otmar Issing
More  Information about the 
cultural days of the ECB can 
be found on the ECB website
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Joint Lunchtime Seminar Series
Is Inflation an International Phenomenon? 
According  to  Milton 
Friedman “inflation is 
always and everywhere 
a  monetary  phenom-
enon.”  Although  this 
statement  is  widely 
accepted by economists 
when  looking  at  the 
persistent  changes 
in  the  price  level, 
it  does  not  rule  out 
the  transitory  effects 
on  inflation  resulting 
from  non-monetary 
factors.  Christopher  Neely,  Assistant  Vice  President  at  the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, is interested in empirical 
research in international finance, with an emphasis on issues 
of  market  efficiency  since  a  number  of  years.  In  his  Joint 
Lunchtime Lecture held on 22 April 2009, he discussed the 
extent to which international inflation rates move together, 
as well as the factors that influence regional and global co-
movements.
There are a number of ways which may potentially tie together 
inflation rates in different countries. Countries participating 
in a fixed exchange rate regime such as Bretton Woods, EMU 
or a unilateral peg are automatically required to implement 
similar monetary policies. In addition, macroeconomic shocks, 
as well as economic and political pressures for central banks 
to react similarly to those shocks, may create co-movements 
of international inflation rates in various countries. However, 
“a  given  country’s  inflation  rate  can  behave  in  a  highly 
idiosyncratic  manner  if  its  central  bank  pursues  monetary 
policies that substantially differ from those of the rest of the 
world,”  indicated  Neely.  Moreover,  he  finds  that  political, 
cultural, demographic and technological factors have an effect 
on a country’s openness and hence, may determine the link 
of movements between domestic and foreign inflation rates.
Yet it is an empirical question to look at the extent to which 
countries’  inflation  rates  are  moving  together.  Neely  deals 
with this issue by applying a so-called dynamic latent factor 
model to 65 national inflation rates between 1951 and 2006. 
His  model  ties  the  national  inflation  rates  to  one  world, 
seven regional and 65 country-specific factors. “The implied 
variance  decomposition  conveniently  measures  the  extent 
to which world, regional, and country-specific components 
explain variations in national inflation rates. The extent to 
which the world and regional factors explain a high proportion 
of  inflation  variability  in  many  countries  indicates  the 
importance of international influences on national inflation 
rates,” said Neely.
As a result, he discovered that the world and the regional 
components make up 34% and 16% of inflation variability 
on  average  across  the  countries.  Specifically,  international 
influences  account  for  half  of  inflation  variability.  The 
significance  of  the  world  and  regional  components,  then 
again, varies considerably across individual countries. Neely 
concluded  that  “economic  and  financial  policy  choices,  as 
well  as  development  measures,  strongly  explain  the  cross-
section variation in the relative importance of international 
influences. A parsimonious model of time variation in the 
factor  loadings  shows  that  most  countries  became  more 
sensitive to the world factor over 1951-2006 and European-
specific  influences  became  more  important  over  time  for 
countries participating in European economic integration.”
Celia Wieland (CFS)
Christopher Neely20
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The Joint Lunchtime Lectures have been organized by the CFS, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the ECB 
for nine years, and hence, have become an integral part on the CFS event calendar. Taking place on a 
weekly basis, the series creates a well established platform for economic experts, particularly in the area 
of monetary policy, to present their current research findings to a selected circle of central bankers 
and macroeconomists. In the first half year of 2009, the three organizing institutions have hosted the 
following economic professionals:
Maxim Ulrich 
(Columbia University)
James Costain 
(Bank of Spain)
Jonathan Wright 
(Johns Hopkins University)
Mathias Hoffmann 
(Universität Zürich)
Pascal St-Amour 
(University of Lausanne)
Joachim Voth 
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Seth Carpenter 
(Federal Reserve Board)
David Thesmar 
(HEC Paris)
Gerhard Illing 
(Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 
München)
Cédric Tille 
(Graduate Institute Geneva)
Nicolas Coeurdacier 
(London Business School)
Jürgen von Hagen 
(Universität Bonn)
Miguel Leon-Ledesma 
(University of Kent)
Christopher Neely 
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)
Todd Clark 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City)
Gianluca Benigno 
(London School of Economics)
Michael Koetter 
(University of Groningen)
Antoine Martin 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
Leena Rudanko 
(Boston University)
Loretta Mester 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia)
Yuriy Gorodnichenko 
(University of California, Berkeley)
Thijs van Rens 
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Gernot Müller 
(Universität Bonn)
Lunchtime Debate
How much instability can capitalism handle?
11 May 2009
Panel discussion with Alexander Dibelius, Gerald Braunberger and Jan Pieter Krahnen
A new book entitled “Der amerikanische 
Virus”  by  Rainer  Hank  (Wirtschafts- 
und  Finanzredaktion,  Frankfurter 
Allgemeine  Sonntagszeitung)  appeared 
in  February  2009.  To  mark  the 
occasion,  CFS  organized  a  luncheon 
debate with Alexander Dibelius (Head 
of  Goldman  Sachs  Germany,  Austria, 
Russia  and  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe), Jan Pieter Krahnen (CFS), and 
Gerald  Braunberger  (Financial  Editor, 
Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung), 
standing in for Rainer Hank. The views 
expressed by Krahnen are summarized 
in the editorial of this newsletter. The 
following paragraphs, therefore, contain 
a summary of the issues raised by the 
other speakers at the meeting.
Alexander Dibelius stated that in recent 
months  capitalism  has  often  been 
severely  criticized  by  the  press  and 
conceded that this criticism was indeed 
understandable. He referred to Francis 
Fukuyama and Adam Smith to describe 
capitalism  with  all  its  strengths  and 
weaknesses and the fundamental desire 
that exists within society for stability. 
Events | Lunchtime Debate
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However,  the  notion  of  permanent 
stability  is  unrealistic  and  stability 
can  certainly  not  be  guaranteed. 
Even  in  an  improved  system  with 
more  regulation,  stability  will  not  be 
inherent, and new crises will continue 
to evolve. His advice was to step away 
from  ideology  and  to  strive  –  in  the 
words  of  Walter  Eucken  and  Ludwig 
Erhard – for an economic policy based 
on  experience  (“erfahrungsmäßig 
basierte Wirtschaftspolitik”). Dibelius 
emphasized  the  importance  of 
responsible behavior on the part of each 
individual.  Liberalism  and  freedom 
are  not  synonyms  for  boundlessness. 
Neither  commercial  policy,  nor  the 
institutional framework can be blamed 
for  crises  since  responsibility  for  the 
economic  system  as  a  whole  rests  in 
fact  on  all  individuals.  Each  person 
is  responsible  for  helping  to  ensure 
the correct functioning of the system. 
Moreover,  regulation  makes  good 
economic  sense  only  where  market 
conditions  represent  a  source  of 
systemic  risk.  Dibelius  concluded  his 
remarks by commenting that economic 
success without economic output is not 
sustainable in the long run.
Gerald  Braunberger  started  with  the 
following  assessment:  instability  is  a 
part  of  capitalism  and  capitalism  can 
stand  up  to  any  form  of  instability. 
However,  society  does  not  appear 
to  be  willing  to  endure  any  level  of 
instability.  Braunberger  distinguished 
between three sources of instability in a 
capitalistic system. First of all, there are 
ups and downs caused by psychological 
factors.  Secondly,  technological 
progress  is  not  a  linear  process  but 
occurs  in  batches.  Braunberger  found 
it  is  surprising  that  technology  has 
been  barely  mentioned  in  discussions 
about  the  current  crisis.  It  is  clear 
that the recent financial sector growth 
was only possible due to developments 
in information technology. Finally, he 
sees a destabilizing effect coming from 
the  regulatory  framework,  although 
the  contrary  is  perceived  to  be  the 
case.  Rules  that  are  badly  construed 
can  foster  instability.  Furthermore, 
the  regulators  themselves  also  exhibit 
cyclical behavior. 
Looking at history, capitalism has tended 
to result in economic growth, and phases 
of  instability  do  not  necessarily  cause 
long-term economic damage. Two crises 
do, however, stand out: the economic 
crisis of the 1930s that led to a political 
radicalization in Europe, and the current 
crisis  that  has  brought  us  close  to  a 
meltdown of the financial system. Only 
massive  government  intervention  has 
been able to stabilize the system. The 
consequences,  in  terms  of  exploding 
public debt, are not yet clear.
Braunberger  called  for  commensurate 
regulation  that  allows  not  only  an 
efficient market-based financial system, 
but also safeguards extensively against 
(systemic)  risks.  The  government 
cannot assume liability for losses, while 
gains are privatized. In his opinion, this 
liability issue should play a crucial role 
in  the  design  of  new  regulation.  He 
concluded his talk with a quote from 
Rainer Hank’s book “Tomorrow’s crises 
are not yet recognized by anyone today” 
(“Die Krisen von morgen kennt heute 
noch niemand”).
Alexander Dibelius
Jan Pieter Krahnen, Gerald Braunberger and Alexander Dibelius
Gerald Braunberger22
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Eleventh Conference of the ECB-CFS Research Network  
“The Market for Retail Financial Services: Development, 
Integration, and Economic Effects”
20-21 October 2008
Hosted by the Czech National Bank in Prague
The 11th conference of the ECB-CFS Research Network, hosted by the Czech National Bank in Prague, was 
the first event of the third phase of the Network. The topic of the conference was “The Market for Retail 
Financial Services: Development, Integration, and Economic Effects” and addressed one of the three new 
priorities set by the Steering Committee. The two-day conference combined 20 research paper presentations 
with two policy panels and two keynote addresses.
In 2002, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Center 
for Financial Studies (CFS) launched a research network 
to  promote  research  on  “Capital  Markets  and  Financial 
Integration in Europe”. The ECB-CFS Research Network 
was initially set up for a period of two years, which ended 
in May 2004 with a symposium organized around its five 
initial priority areas. Following the successful conclusion 
of this first phase, the ECB and the CFS decided to extend 
the  activities  of  the  Network  for  a  further  three  years, 
until 2007. The scope of the Network during this second 
phase was also extended to include the new EU Member 
States  and  was  concluded  with  a  second  symposium  of 
the ECB-CFS Research Network, hosted by the European 
Central Bank in Frankfurt on 13-14 February 2008 (see also 
Newsletter 1/08).
On 12 July 2006, the Steering Committee (SC) proposed a 
further extension of the Network for three more years after 
the completion of the second phase. For this third phase, 
three new priorities were selected, replacing the 8 priorities 
that were active until 2007.
At its meeting during the second symposium, the SC called 
for the research priorities previously agreed upon in July 
2006  to  be  adapted  in  order  to  take  account  of  recent 
developments. In particular, the SC decided that Network 
research  should  pay  greater  attention  to  implications  for 
financial stability and monetary policy under the existing 
three priorities. It was agreed that during the third phase of 
the Network particular attention in both the conferences and 
the Lamfalussy Fellowships should be given to the following 
three topics:
1)   financial systems as risk managers, risk distributors and 
risk creators; 
2)   the integration and development of retail financial services 
and the promotion of innovative firms; 
3)   financial modernization, governance and the integration of 
the European financial system in global capital markets.
Priority 2 was addressed by the first conference of the Third 
Phase – in effect the 11th conference of the Network hosted 
by the Czech National Bank in Prague – under the topic: 
“The  Market  for  Retail  Financial  Services:  Development, 
Integration, and Economic Effects”. Priority 3 concerns the 
international financial architecture and will be the topic of 
the first Network event in 2009. 
The SC of the ECB-CFS Research Network is composed of 
representatives from the two organizing institutions: 
Chair: Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell (European Central Bank) 
Michael Binder (CFS and Goethe University Frankfurt)
Philipp Hartmann (European Central Bank)
Jan Pieter Krahnen (CFS and Goethe University Frankfurt)
Philippe Moutot (European Central Bank)
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The opening remarks were delivered by the Governor of the 
Czech National Bank Zdenek Tuma. He started by pointing 
out  that  the  topic  of  the  conference  could  not  have  been 
more relevant given the current situation in global financial 
markets. In his opinion, European financial integration has 
made rapid progress, albeit to a lesser degree for the retail 
finance market. He raised three questions, which he hoped 
the conference would address. First, what are – if any – the 
limits to integration in retail finance? Second, what are the 
implications of the integration of retail banking on growth? 
And finally, can regulation be designed such that financial 
stability is guaranteed while competition is promoted? 
The first session on “Retail Banks: Competition, M&As and 
Cross-Border  Issues”  brought  important  findings  by  Ben 
Craig (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland), who addressed 
the effect of bank mergers on the dynamics of deposit rates. 
The second paper in this session was presented by Adrian 
van Rixtel (Banco de España) and focused on a similar topic, 
namely, the effect of loan market competition on the interest 
rates applied by euro area banks on loans and deposits.
The session on “Payment Systems” was chaired by Cornelia 
Holthausen  (European  Central  Bank).  She  pointed  out 
that  the  two  papers  in  the  session  –  “Consumer  choice 
and  merchant  acceptance  of  payment  media”  presented 
by  Sujit  Chakravorti  (Federal  Reserve  Bank  Chicago) 
and  “Integrating  European  retail  payment  systems:  some 
economics  of  SEPA”  presented  by  Kari  Kemppainen  – 
had the same general goal, namely, measuring the efficiency 
effects of payment systems’ integration, which is a particularly 
relevant,  but  hitherto  not  extensively  researched,  topic  in 
modern economics. The discussant of this session was Henri 
Pages (Banque de France).
A parallel session on “Retail Banking Integration and Access 
to Credit” was chaired by Jan Frait (Czech National Bank). 
The first paper, “A quantitative theory of information and 
unsecured credit”, presented by Kartik Athreya (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond) aims at providing an explanation 
for five big trends in unsecured credit markets – rising debt, 
rising  default,  rising  discharge,  increasing  dispersion  of 
interest rates, and increasing good borrower discounts. The 
second  paper,  “Integration  in  the  European  retail  banking 
sector: evidence from savings and lending rates”, presented 
by  Aarti  Rughoo  (London  Metropolitan  University), 
investigates the degree of integration in the retail banking 
sector for 15 European Union member states in the period 
1991-2008.
In  her  keynote  address,  Gertrude  Tumpel-Gugerell 
(Member of the Executive Board, European Central Bank) 
reviewed the change in the banks’ business model in recent 
years.  With  more  funding  via  market  sources  rather  than 
from deposits, and diversification in the sources of revenues 
via non-interest income, the profits of the banks have become 
more volatile. She also addressed the implementation of SEPA 
and its importance for retail banks. In view of the strong 
growth  world  wide  in  non-cash  transactions,  Europe  has 
shown a more moderate growth rate in non-cash payments. 
In  her  opinion,  this  development  is  crucial  for  the  real 
sector since retail payment activity spurs economic growth 
by  reducing  transaction  costs  and  creating  new  business 
opportunities.  She  also  spoke  about  the  “final  hurdles” 
involved in implementing SEPA and its timeframe before the 
end of 2009. 
The  following  session  on  “Recent  Developments  in  Retail 
Finance“  was  chaired  by  Jan  Pieter  Krahnen  (CFS). 
Carole  Bernard  (University  of  Waterloo)  focused  on 
specific structured investment products, and endeavored to 
explain  why  retail  investors  buy  these  complex  contracts. 
The economic role of the insurance sector was the topic of 
the next presentation by Kjell Suemegi (Vienna University 
of  Economics  and  Business  Administration).  He  analyzed 
Zdenek Tuma
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by looking at different channels 
of  influence  such  as  risk 
transfer  and  investment  how 
the insurance sector influences 
economic  growth.  The  third 
presentation  by  Jos  van 
Bommel (University of Oxford) 
focused  on  an  innovative  and 
increasingly popular structured 
product  –  the  endless  leverage 
certificate (ELC) – and looked 
at  its  pricing  and  secondary 
market liquidity.
The parallel session was on “Retail 
Finance in the New EU Member States”. The first paper, 
presented  by  Anita  Taci  (EBRD),  examines  how  bank 
characteristics  and  the  institutional  environment  influence 
the  composition  of  banks’  loan  portfolios  and  shows  that 
bank  ownership  and  size  are  the  main  determinants  of 
bank customer focus. The second paper, presented by Petr 
Zemcík  (CERGE-EI)  is  an  empirical  investigation  of  the 
effects of changes in mortgage payments, housing prices, and 
rents on household consumption in the Czech Republic.
The first panel discussion about the integration of banking 
supervision was chaired by Ignazio Angeloni (European 
Central  Bank).  He  opened  the  debate  by  stating  that  the 
current crisis had led to new insights on the importance of 
supervision. He pointed out that the main difference between 
the U.S. and Europe in this respect is that Europe has a more 
formal  regulatory  process.  In  his  opinion,  the  Lamfalussy 
framework has so far been very successful at the legislation 
level, but progress with national implementation has been less 
satisfactory. Currently, there is cooperation at a global level 
through the Financial Stability Forum, which in his opinion, 
is  a  very  successful  initiative.  Miroslav  Singer  (Czech 
National Bank) first spoke about the experiences of the Czech 
Republic during the current financial turmoil. With regard 
to regulation, he argued that none of the disturbing events 
over the past months could have been prevented by a unified 
European  supervision.  In  his  opinion,  even  though  there 
were obvious problems with information asymmetries, the 
current crisis was not caused by a lack of unified supervision 
and could hardly have been prevented by the existence of 
it. He concluded that Europe should proceed with utmost 
caution  towards  cross-border  supervision  and  stressed  the 
importance of supervision at home. The next panelist, Kari 
Kemppainen (Bank of Finland) recalled for the audience 
Finland’s  severe  banking  crisis  in  the  early  90s.  At  that 
time, banking crises were national, but this is obviously no 
longer the case. In his opinion, a pan-European College of 
Supervisors,  analogous  to  the  ESCB  (European  System  of 
Central Banks), was a feasible concept for dealing with an 
international  crisis.  Vitor  Gaspar  (Bureau  of  European 
Policy Advisors) pointed out that there are different levels of 
governance – national, international (e.g. the euro zone), and 
global. In the run-up to the crisis, countries have shown an 
impressive ability to cooperate across borders. However, this 
fast and coordinated action was mainly driven by the obvious 
spillover effects. He argued that Europe needs a flexible way 
of reconciling efficiency and stability.
The second day of the conference started with a presentation 
by Santiago Carbo-Valverde (University of Granada and 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  Chicago)  on  the  sensitivity  of  SME 
investments to bank loans and trade credit. He concluded 
that his results confirm that constrained firms do indeed rely 
more on trade credit and unconstrained firms more on bank 
loans. Hannah Hempell (Deutsche Bundesbank) presented 
the  second  paper,  which  investigates  empirically  whether 
competition has an effect on rate dispersion. Her conclusion 
is that local competition still matters for access to credit, 
and  therefore  European  policies  to  promote  competition 
should  also  take  this  fact  into  consideration.  The  third 
paper presented by Klaus Schaeck (University of Wales) 
investigates  banking  relationships  and  the  use  of  venture 
capital for SMEs. The paper finds that younger and larger 
firms tend to rely more on VC whereas firms with multiple 
banking  relationships  tend  to  make  less  use  of  VC.  He 
concludes that the availability of VC dramatically enhances 
the performance of SMEs.
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The parallel session looked at retail finance from a practical 
angle  with  presentations  by  Dubravko  Mihaljek  (Bank 
for International Settlements), who looked at recent trends 
in capital flows to and from emerging market economies, 
Markus Eller (Oesterreichische Nationalbank) with a paper 
analyzing the equilibrium level of private credit to GDP in 
Central and Eastern European countries, and Nicole Jonker 
(De  Nederlandsche  Bank),  who  analyzed  differences  in 
payment behavior at home and abroad and between countries.
Hans-Helmut  Kotz  (Deutsche  Bundesbank)  opened 
the  second  panel  discussion  with  Radek  Urban  (Ceska 
Sporitelna), Costa Vayenas (UBS AG), and Jim Strang 
(Dunedin  Capital  Partners)  giving  a  market  participant’s 
view on the current financial turmoil. His conclusions after 
hearing the panelists were twofold: do not try to beat the 
market, and be sure to diversify. Also, he said that policy 
makers should work on educating investors on what returns 
to expect, in the sense that most investors surveyed expect 
average annual returns that are much higher than the actual 
returns.
In  his  keynote  speech,  Roman  Inderst  (IMFS,  Goethe 
University  Frankfurt)  addressed  current  problems  with 
regulatory  policies  from  three  angles:  the  missing  supply 
side, innovation and regulation, and a discussion of optimal 
policies.  He  stated  that  the  supply  of  funds  had  played 
an  important  role  in  the  last  decade,  but  had  remained 
surprisingly neglected. Next, he questioned comments, so 
often raised in recent months, about there being “too much 
innovation”.  In  his  opinion,  the  U.S.  experience  showed 
that  financial  innovation  had  made  credit  markets  more 
complete. He disagreed that there was a trade-off between 
innovation and competition. Instead, he said, there is a need 
for a regulatory framework that promotes both innovation 
and competition. Finally, Inderst worried that the principles 
of  competition  were  being  severely  undermined.  He  said 
that, by sacrificing competition for stability, policy-makers 
were  being  too  shortsighted,  and  that  policies  to  restore 
competition would be needed very soon.
In  the  last  session  Christian  Beer  (Vienna  University) 
presented a paper on the causes and effects of carry trades 
by Austrian households. Another paper presented by Deniz 
Igan  (International  Monetary  Fund)  links  the  subprime 
mortgage crisis to a decline in lending standards associated 
with the rapid expansion of this market. The authors find 
that  lending  standards  tend  to  decline  more  in  areas  with 
larger credit booms and house price increases as well as in 
areas  with  higher  mortgage  securitization  rates.  The  third 
paper presented by Angela Maddaloni (European Central 
Bank) analyzes the impact of monetary policy on bank lending 
standards. The main findings are that lower overnight rates 
soften bank credit standards, whilst securitization makes the 
impact stronger.
In  his  closing  remarks,  Philipp  Hartmann  (European 
Central Bank) reviewed five distinct topics that the conference 
had focused on: competition, regulation, financial stability, 
integration of payment systems and retail finance in the new 
EU member states. Hartmann also thanked the organizers for 
an excellent conference.
The text is based on the Conference Summary and is also available 
on the network’s website.
Roman Inderst
→   The conference program as well as papers and presentations with references 
to all co-authors not mentioned in this article can be found on the network’s 
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The current financial crisis has raised several questions about 
the  role  of  risk  management.  For  example,  observers  ask 
‘why  the  sophisticated  models  did  not  properly  capture  the  risks 
of  securitized  financial  products’  and  ‘why  state  of  the  art  RM 
systems  failed  to  prevent  the  financial  crisis’.  While  it  would 
be  dangerous  to  jump  to  conclusions,  it  is  safe  to  say  that 
risk  management  faces  several  organizational  and  structural 
challenges. These challenges involve implementing a complex 
system  that  is  easy  to  understand  as  well  as  improving 
communication,  designing  interfaces  between  qualitative 
models  and  quantitative  assessments,  and  obtaining  senior 
management commitment. Choosing the right models for the 
right questions and communicating the results determines the 
effectiveness of risk management. To promote the discussion 
of these issues, CFS together with the Deutsche Aktieninstitut 
e.V. chose the topic “Organizational and Structural Challenges 
of Risk Management” for their 4th joint seminar, which was 
held at the Goethe University Frankfurt on 26 March 2009. 
The seminar was part of the CFS program “Insurance and Risk 
Transfer”  and  was  organized  by  Walther  Kiep  (Managing 
Director of Kiep Consulting GmbH) and Christian Laux 
(Goethe University and Program Director at CFS).
With  many  distinguished  speakers 
and  about  60  participants,  the 
program’s  topics  provided  valuable 
insights  into  numerous  aspects  of 
the organization and effectiveness of 
risk manage  ment. In his wel  coming 
address,  Rüdiger  von  Rosen 
(Mana  ging  Director,  Deutsches 
Aktien  institut e.V.) stressed that the 
current financial crisis is also perceived to be a crisis of risk 
management. In his view, it is particularly the systemic risk 
that has been underestimated. On the other hand, it is not 
clear if the crisis would not have been worse without risk 
manage  ment. By way of a solution, he called for companies 
to have higher levels of risk capital in order to create a buffer 
against adverse events in the future. Moreover, he emphasized 
that  the  willingness  of  investors  to  provide  equity  capital 
depends on the institutional setting, especially with respect 
to taxes.
In  his  introduction,  Christian 
Laux asked about the lessons to be 
learned from the financial crisis. One 
key  problem  seems  to  be  that  too 
much  faith  has  been  placed  in  the 
output of complex models, creating a 
dangerous feeling of safety. Moreover, 
there  has  been  a  clear  tendency  to 
underestimate  the  incentive  and 
feedback effects of credit risk transfers. Risk management has 
allowed more risks to be taken and incentives have been given 
to do so. However, initially uncorrelated risks suddenly affected 
all market participants. A sound integrated risk management 
needs to account for questions that quantitative models will 
not answer. It needs to consider not only correlation but also 
economic interdependencies, which often arise endogenously 
rather than exogenously. Moreover, risk management per se 
will not reduce management’s appetite for risk. However, at 
the  same  time,  management  cannot  make  sound  decisions 
without an effective risk management system in place.
Frank  Romeike  (Board,  Risk 
Management  Association  (RMA) 
e.V.,  and  Managing  Partner, 
RiskNET GmbH) presented a variety 
of  potential  pitfalls  in  quantitative 
risk  management  approaches.  First, 
models  often  lack  data  and  proper 
specifications.  Moreover,  most  of 
the distributions used in quantitative 
assessments  underestimate  “fat-tails”  and  tend  instead  to 
exploit  normal  densities’  easily  manageable  characteristics. 
Models thereby fail to recognize black swans. For the remainder 
of his presentation, Romeike focused on how to overcome these 
flaws. One important aspect is to constantly run sanity checks 
on model in- and outputs, involving senior level management. 
A necessary requirement for a responsible treatment of risks is 
Rüdiger von Rosen
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that risk owners have clear responsibilities and well-understood 
risk management processes are in place.
Dieter Schmitt (Managing Director, adidas Versicherungs-
Vermitt  lungs  GmbH)  out  lined  how  insurance  management 
at adidas has evolved to eventually become risk management. 
He  stressed  the  difficulty  in  measuring  risk  manage  ment’s 
value  added,  especially  when  taking  into  account  that  it  is 
driven  strongly  by  regulation  and  EU  directives.  A  crucial 
success factor for implementing risk management at adidas has 
been the consistent reporting and documentation framework 
throughout the organization. This has enabled the implemen-
tation of the necessary risk culture. Meanwhile, adidas has 
established an internal risk market, which enables functions 
within the organization to “manage” their own risks either via 
insurance, retention or capital market transfer.
Jens  Schmidt-Bürgel  (Managing 
Director, Fitch Deutschland GmbH) 
began  his  presentation  by  stressing 
that  credit  ratings  are  often  misun-
derstood.  They  provide  information 
about  default  probabilities,  and  only 
very few exceptions include loss given 
default figures. In particular, ratings 
also  do  not  incorporate  information 
on liquidity or market risk factors. Schmidt-Bürgel predicts that 
the importance of ratings will grow in the future and argued 
that early warning signs related to the capital market crisis were 
available, but ignored. Even though the worst is over, a large 
fraction of leveraged instruments are still outstanding so that a 
second round of defaults may not be unlikely. Schmidt-Bürgel 
predicts a slow economic turnaround in 2010.
Reiner  Hoffmann  (Head  of  Corporate  Solutions,  Allianz 
Global Corporate & Speciality AG) pointed out the difficulties 
of benchmarking when the performance measure is merely one 
realization of a distribution. But at the same time, when data 
is highly aggregated, many valuable details are lost. Moreover, 
different addressees have different interpretations of the figures 
and an unambiguous measure is impossible. Hoffmann sket-
ched the risk balance sheet as a possible solution, but cautioned 
that communicating risk metrics may be equally as problematic 
as communicating performance measures. He argued that an 
important step to overcoming the problems is to price the risk. 
For example, by transferring the risk to an insurer, it is priced 
and noise in performance measures is reduced. The reduction 
of the variance may, ceteris paribus, enable performance mea-
sures to convey better information.
Johannes  Wedding  (Managing 
Director  and  Partner,  Wedding  & 
Partner)  focused  on  the  legal  requi-
rements for external auditors. Speci-
fically, the auditor’s task is to certify 
the  correctness  of  the  risk  manage-
ment  system  and  not  the  decisions 
made subject to its output. Moreover, 
Wedding showed how the definition of 
insurance differs according to the underlying accounting prin-
ciples involved, i.e. IAS / IFRS, German GAAP, US GAAP, or 
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). 
Important  issues  in  the  definition  of  insurance  include  the 
distinction between timing risk and underwriting risk as well as 
the significance of the involved risk transfer.
Walther  Kiep  hosted  a  panel 
with  leading  experts  to  discuss 
the  challenges  of  corporate  risk 
management.  Participants  on  the 
panel were Thomas Berger (Project 
Manager, Future Value Group AG), 
Tore  Ellingsen  (Managing  Director, 
The  Royal  Bank  of  Scotland  plc), 
Wolfgang  Henle  (VP  Opportunity 
and Risk Management, Austrian Airlines AG), Jutta Hennecke 
(Senior Manager, PricewaterhouseCoopers AG), and Michael 
Lomitschka (Director Group-Risk Controlling, MVV Energie 
AG). In the opening discussion, it was mentioned that the 
selective reporting of business risks in annual reports leads to a 
biased perception by investors regarding the risk management 
activities of companies. However, innovative solutions such as 
Insurance Linked Securities are continuing to gain ground, 
thus facilitating capital efficiency management. The panelists 
agreed  that  the  hardest  task  is  to  justify  risk  management 
strategies  after  adverse  events  occur.  This  is  an  especially 
delicate  situation  because  some  events  are  deliberately  not 
insured  or  transferred  as  premiums  may  be  too  high  and 
self-insurance is the cheaper alternative – in particular, when 
taking  into  account  the  need  to  provide  managers  with 
incentives  to  react  to  changes.  Moreover,  inconsistent  or 
missing data still complicate a consistent quantitative approach. 
It is risk management’s task to complete these data so as to 
minimize “model risk”. Senior management will thereby be 
encouraged to make sustainable decisions based on better facts. 
In the closing discussion, it became apparent that companies’ 
business risks remained uninsurable. It should in fact be in the 
companies’ own interest to retain these risks because after all 
they represent their core competency.
Jens Schmidt-Bürgel
Walther Kiep
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The Deutsche Bank Prize 
in  Financial  Economics 
2009 is awarded to the 
U.S.  economist  Robert 
J.  Shiller.  The  Jury 
has  chosen  Professor 
Shiller for his pioneering 
research  in  the  field  of 
financial  economics, 
relating to the dynamics 
of  asset  prices,  such  as 
fixed  income,  equities, 
and  real  estate,  and  their  metrics.  His  work  has  been 
influential  in  the  development  of  the  theory  as  well 
as  its  implications  for  practice  and  policy-making.  His 
contributions on risk sharing, financial market volatility, 
bubbles  and  crises,  have  received  widespread  attention 
among academics, practitioners and policy makers alike.
The  award  will  be  presented  to  Robert  Shiller  by  Josef 
Ackermann (Chairman of the Management Board and the 
Group Executive Committee of Deutsche Bank AG) in a 
ceremony to be held in Frankfurt on 30 September 2009.
Prior to the award ceremony, the international academic 
symposium “Financial Innovation and Economic Crisis”, 
a scientific discussion on themes highlighted in Shiller’s 
work,  will  take  place  at  Campus  Westend.  We  are 
delighted to announce that Robert C. Merton, the John 
and  Natty  McArthur  University  Professor  at  Harvard 
Business  School  and  Nobel  Laureate  in  Economics,  has 
already confirmed his participation as plenary speaker in 
this event.
Email: db-prize@ifk-cfs.de  •  www.db-prize-financialeconomics.org
Robert J. Shiller
Josef Ackermann
→     CFS Symposium “Financial Innovation and Economic Crisis” 
Date: 30 September 2009 12:00 – 17:00 
Venue: Campus Westend, Goethe University, new lecture hall (Hörsaal 2) 
Please register for this event online on www.db-prize-financialeconomics.org. 
-- The number of participants is limited --
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“There could probably not be a more appropriate time to honor Professor Robert 
J. Shiller with the Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics for his outstanding 
research  work  on  the  volatility  of  asset  prices  and  the  related  macroeconomic 
risks. Professor Shiller has not only developed financial instruments and databases 
to gauge the extent of over-exuber  ance on capital and property markets. He has 
also  used  these  instruments  to  give  timely  warnings  on  the  risks  of  such  over-
exuberance. However, his research has not been con  fined to problem analysis; he has 
also published numerous studies aimed at solving the problems. For this reason, his 
research findings have spread far beyond the academic community and are relevant 
for policymakers and financial market players alike.”29
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Jury members
A Jury of international financial experts decides on the recipient of the Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics. 
The members of this year’s Jury are: Michael Binder (Goethe University and CFS), Otmar Issing (CFS President), 
Takatoshi Ito (University of Tokyo), Jan Pieter Krahnen (Goethe University and CFS), Reinhard H. Schmidt 
(Goethe  University),  Klaus  Schmidt-Hebbel  (OECD),  Marti  Subrahmanyam  (Stern  School,  New  York 
University), Maria Vassalou (SAC Capital Advisors LLC and EFA), Norbert Walter (Deutsche Bank Group), 
and Volker Wieland (Goethe University and CFS). Chairman of the Jury is CFS Director Jan Pieter Krahnen. 
More than 3600 university teachers and researchers from more than 55 countries had the opportunity to submit a suggestion 
for the nomination. At this occasion, the Jury would like to thank the nominators for their immense support during the 
nomination procedure.
Otmar Issing
“There  is  one  name  that  has  been  at  the  centre  of  the  debate  around  the 
identification  of  “bubbles”  in  asset  prices:  Professor  Robert  Shiller.  His 
warnings against excessive share and real estate prices are based on pioneering 
studies which have brought significant theoretical and empirical impulses to 
economic research. The combination of his top-class academic research and his 
contributions to objectifying the public debate make him the ideal candidate to 
receive the Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics 2009.”
Jan Pieter Krahnen
“Through his innovative work exploring the dynamics of asset prices, Robert 
Shiller has become a pioneer in the field of financial economics. His findings 
on the volatility of share prices, the occurrence of price bubbles and resultant 
crises, as well as on the distribution of macroeconomic risks are not only of 
great academic importance, they have also broken new ground in economic 
practice.”
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Takatoshi Ito
 “Professor Shiller is a very versatile scholar. He first became well-known among 
macro-finance professors because of his excellent work on asset price volatility and 
on an asset price bubble (sustained deviation of a market price from fundamental 
value).Then, he has started to write more policy relevant articles and books, warning 
about tech bubble and housing bubble.  He also transformed his research on housing 
prices into a commercial venture to calculate and publish a housing price index. Now, 
the Case-Shiller index is a standard, reliable housing price index everyone uses, and 
there is securities trading based on this index. Housing prices are notorious in non-
comparability due to each housing unit being unique in its location, floor space, 
years since built, and other characteristics. The Case-Shiller index is calculated 
using repeated sales units so that many of the characteristics can be regarded the 
same. His ability to transform research from basic to policy-relevant, and from basic 
to commercially useful should be highly regarded, and the award is timely and well-
deserved.”
Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
“The Deutsche Bank Prize is awarded to an outstanding economist who has made 
path-breaking contributions to theory, empirics and /or policy in the fields of finance, 
money or macroeconomics. Nobody fulfills these conditions better than Robert Shiller. 
His analytical and empirical work on asset price dynamics, equity price volatility, 
asset and housing price bubbles, financial crises, and risk diversification has extended 
significantly the frontier of financial economics. His prescient work and warnings on 
the development of the 1990s-early 2000s stock market boom and bust and the 2000s 
housing and stock market bubble that led to the ongoing global financial crisis and 
recession are proof of Shiller’s rare combination of analytical strength and empirical 
insightfulness. There is no better recipient of the 2009 Deutsche Bank Prize in 
Financial Economics than Professor Shiller.”
Marti Subrahmanyam
“Professor Robert Shiller is one of the world’s foremost researchers on financial 
markets and has been working in the intersection of macroeconomics and financial 
markets for almost four decades. His work spans a broad spectrum of issues that 
are both academically challenging and practically relevant. Noteworthy examples 
of his extensive research on the limits of market efficiency include his papers on 
“excess volatility”, predictability of asset returns, behavioral macroeconomics, 
and real estate economics. His work on pricing metrics, particularly in the area 
of real estate, has had a major impact on practice and policy making. Given the 
breadth of his research, Professor Shiller is uniquely qualified to address the 
important issues relating to the current global financial crisis.”
Maria Vassalou
“Shiller’s  important  work  on  the  excess  volatility  puzzle  has  far-reaching 
implications  for  economic  models  of  price  fluctuations.  His  contribution  has 
greatly shaped the evolution of both academic and practitioners’ thinking on the 
pricing of assets in speculative markets.”
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Robert Shiller is the Arthur M. Okun Professor of Economics 
at the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale 
University,  and  Professor  of  Finance  at  the  International 
Center for Finance, Yale School of Management. He received 
his  Ph.D.  in  Economics  from  the  Massachusetts  Institute 
of Technology (MIT) in 1972. Robert Shiller has been a 
Research  Associate  at  the  National  Bureau  of  Economic 
Research since 1980. In 2005, he also served as Vice President 
of the American Economic Association. He regularly writes 
the column “Economic View” for the New York Times. In 
1996, he received the Paul A. Samuelson award for his book 
Macro Markets: Creating Institutions for Managing Society’s 
Largest Economic Risks.
By  combining  theoretical  and  empirical  analysis  on  the 
volatility of asset prices, in particular stocks, bonds and real 
estate, Robert Shiller has made a decisive contribution to the 
understanding of price fluctuations in these markets. His 
research has led to the development of financial instruments 
to hedge against macroeconomic risks. Amongst other things, 
Robert Shiller has been jointly responsible for developing 
the  Standard  &  Poor's/Case-Shiller  Home  Price  Index 
for the most important metropolitan regions in the U.S., 
which is widely used in academic research and investment 
management. He is also the co-founder and Chief Economist 
of MacroMarkets LLC, which designs innovative financing 
instruments in order to complete financial markets.
Based on his analyses Robert Shiller has been very influential 
for the tone of research in this field and delivers valuable 
insights for the world of practice. He predicted the peak of 
the new-economy euphoria and the collapse of the market 
and published the best-selling book Irrational Exuberance 
in the year 2000. In 2005, he was one of the first to identify 
a real estate bubble in the U.S., and predicted that it would 
burst and trigger a financial crisis. In his new book Animal 
Spirits, co-written with Nobel Prize winner George Akerlof, 
Robert Shiller makes the case for a more active state role 
in financial markets owing to the existence of the “human 
factor”.
ROBERT J. SHILLER – THE PRIZEWINNER 2009
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The  prize  was  awarded  for  the  first  time  in  2005  to 
Eugene  F.  Fama,  Professor  of  Finance  at  the  University 
of Chicago, for devel  oping and researching the concept of 
market efficiency. An international sci  entific symposium on 
“Market Efficiency Today” was organized on the occasion of 
the award ceremony.
In 2007, Michael Woodford, Professor of Political Economy 
at Columbia Uni  versity in New York, received the prize in 
recognition of his fundamental con  tributions to the theory 
and practical analysis of monetary  policy. The aca  demic 
CFS Symposium “The Theory and Practice of Monetary 
Policy Today”, held in honor of Professor Woodford’s work, 
took place prior to the presenta  tion of the award.
Sabine Neumann and Daniela Dimitrova (CFS)
The Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics is awarded biannually and carries an endowment of € 50,000 
which is donated by the Stiftungsfonds Deutsche Bank im Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft. The award 
honors internationally renowned economic researchers whose work has significantly influenced research in financial 
economics and macroeconomics, and has led to fundamental advances in economic theory and practice.
THE AWARD WINNERS IN 2005 AND 2007
Selected Books
Animal Spirits: How Human 
Psychology Drives the Economy 
and Why It Matters for 
Global Capitalism, Princeton 
University Press, March 2009, 
with George Akerlof, translated 
into 7 languages.
Subprime Solution: How 
Today's Global Financial Crisis 
Happened and What to Do 
about It, Princeton University 
Press, September 2008, 
translated into 6 languages.
The New Financial Order: Risk 
in the 21st Century, Princeton 
University Press, April 2003, 
translated into 7 languages
 
Irrational Exuberance, 
Princeton University Press, 
2000 & 2005 Republished, 
Broadway Books, April 2001, 
translated into 15 languages, 
winner of the Commonfund 
Prize.
Macro Markets: Creating 
Institutions for Managing 
Society's Largest Economic 
Risks, Oxford University Press, 
1993, winner of the Paul A. 
Samuelson Award from TIAA-
CREF.
Market Volatility, MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA, 1989.
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Lydia  Lopokova,  wife  of  the  economist  John  Maynard 
Keynes,  was  a  famous  ballerina.  She  was  also  a  Russian 
émigré. Thus Keynes knew from the experience of his in-
laws the horrors of living in the worst of socialist economies. 
But he also knew first-hand the great difficulties that come 
from unregulated, unfettered capitalism. He lived through 
the British depression of the 1920s and 1930s. Thus Keynes 
was inspired to find a middle way for modern economies.
We are seeing, in this financial crisis, a rebirth of Keynesian 
economics.  We  are  talking  again  of  his  1936  book  The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, which 
was  written  during  the  Great  Depression.  This  era,  like 
the present, saw many calls to end capitalism as we know 
it. The 1930s have been called the heyday of communism 
in western countries. Keynes's middle way would avoid the 
unemployment  and  the  panics  and  manias  of  capitalism. 
But it would also avoid the economic and political controls 
of  communism.  The  General  Theory  became  the  most 
important economics book of the 20th century because of its 
sensible balanced message.
In times of high unemployment, creditworthy governments 
should expand demand by deficit spending. Then, in times 
of  low  unemployment,  governments  should  pay  down 
the resultant debt. With that seemingly minor change in 
procedures, a capitalist system can be stable. There is no 
need for radical surgery on capitalism.
Adherents to Keynes's message were so eager to get this 
simple policy implemented, on both sides of the Atlantic, 
that  they  failed  to  notice  –  or  perhaps  they  intentionally 
disregarded – that the General Theory also had a deeper, 
more fundamental message about how capitalism worked, 
if  only  briefly  spelled  out.  It  explained  why  capitalist 
economies, left to their own devices, without the balancing 
of governments, were essentially unstable. And it explained 
why, for capitalist economies to work well, the government 
should serve as a counterbalance.
The key to this insight was the role Keynes gave to people’s 
psychological  motivations.  These  are  usually  ignored  by 
macroeconomists.  Keynes  called  them  animal  spirits,  and 
he thought they were especially important in determining 
people’s willingness to take risks. Businessmen’s calculations, 
he  said,  were  precarious:  “Our  basis  of  knowledge  for 
estimating the yield 10 years hence of a railway, a copper mine, 
a textile factory, the goodwill of a patent medicine, an Atlantic 
liner, a building in the City of London amounts to little and 
sometimes to nothing.” Despite this, people somehow make 
decisions and act. This “can only be taken as a result of animal 
spirits”. There is “a spontaneous urge to action”.
There are times when people are especially adventuresome – 
indeed, too much so. Their adventures are supported in these 
times by a blithe faith in the future, and trust in economic 
institutions. These are the upswing of the business cycle. But 
then the animal spirits also veer in the other direction, and 
then people are too wary.
George Akerlof and I, in our book Animal Spirits (Princeton 
2009), expand on Keynes’s concept and tie it in to modern 
literature on behavioural economics and psychology. Much 
more clarity about the psychological underpinnings of animal 
spirits is possible today.
For  example,  social  psychologists,  notably  Roger  Schank 
and  Robert  Abelson,  have  shown  how  much  stories  and 
storytelling,  especially  human-interest  stories,  motivate 
much of human behaviour. These stories can count for much 
more than abstract calculation. People’s economic moods are 
largely based on the stories that people tell themselves and 
tell each other that are related to the economy.
We have seen these stories come and go in rapid succession in 
recent years. We first had the dotcom bubble and the envy-
producing stories of young millionaires. It burst in 2000, 
but was soon replaced with another bubble, involving smart 
“flippers” of properties.
This mania was the product not only of a story about people 
but also a story about how the economy worked. It was part 
of a story that all investments in securitised mortgages were 
safe because those smart people were buying them. Those 
enviable people who are buying these assets must be checking 
on them, therefore we do not need to. We need only run 
alongside them.
Professor Shiller wrote the following article as guest writer for the Financial Times 
A failure to control the animal spirits
By Robert Shiller
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What allowed this mania and these stories to persist as long 
as they did? To a remarkable extent we have got into the 
current economic and financial crisis because of a wrong 
economic theory – an economic theory that itself denied the 
role of the animal spirits in getting us into manias and panics.
According  to  the  standard  “classical”  theory,  which  goes 
back to Adam Smith with his Wealth of Nations in 1776, the 
economy is essentially stable. If people rationally pursue their 
own economic interests in free markets they will exhaust 
all mutually beneficial opportunities to produce goods and 
exchange with one another. Such exhaustion of opportunities 
for mutually beneficial trade results in full employment. By 
this theory it could not be otherwise.
Of  course,  some  workers  will  be  unemployed.  But  they 
will  be  unable  to  find  work  only  because  they  are  in  a 
temporary search for a job or because they insist on pay 
that is unreasonably high. Such unemployment is viewed as 
voluntary, and evokes no sympathy.
Classical theory also tells us that financial markets will also 
be stable. People will only make trades that they consider 
to benefit themselves. When entering financial markets –
buying stocks or bonds or taking out a mortgage or even very 
complex securities – they will do due diligence in seeing that 
what they are buying is worth what they are paying, or what 
they are selling.
What this theory neglects is that there are times when people 
are too trusting. And it also fails to take into account that if 
it can do so profitably, capitalism will produce not only what 
people really want, but also what they think they want. It can 
produce the medicine people want to cure their ills. That is 
what people really want. But if it can do so profitably, it will 
also produce what people mistakenly want.
It will produce snake oil. Not only that: it may also produce 
the  want  for  the  snake  oil  itself.  That  is  a  downside  to 
capitalism.  Standard  economic  theory  failed  to  take  into 
account that buyers and sellers of assets might not be taking 
due  diligence,  and  the  marketplace  was  not  selling  them 
insurance against risk in the complex securities that they 
were buying, but was, instead, selling them the financial 
equivalent of snake oil.
There is a broader moral to all this – about the nature of 
capitalism. On the one hand, we want to take advantage of 
the wisdom of Adam Smith. For the most part, the products 
produced by capitalism are what we really want, produced 
at a price that we are willing and able to pay. On the other 
hand,  when  confidence  is  high,  and  since  financial  assets 
are hard to evaluate by those who are buying them, people 
will and do buy snake oil. And when that is discovered, 
as it invariably must be, the confidence disappears and the 
economy goes sour.
It is the role of the government at two levels to see that 
these events do not occur. First, it has a duty to regulate 
asset markets so that people are not falsely lured into buying 
snake-oil assets. Such standards for our financial assets make 
as much common sense as the standards for the food we eat, 
or the purchase medicine we get from the pharmacy. But we 
do not want to throw out the good parts of capitalism with 
the bad. To take advantage of the good parts of capitalism, 
when fluctuations occur it is the role of the government to 
see that those who can and want to produce what others want 
to buy can do so. It is the role of the government, through 
its counterbalancing fiscal and monetary policy, to maintain 
full employment.
The principles behind such an economy are not the principles 
behind  a  socialist  economy.  The  government  insofar  as 
possible is only creating the macroeconomic conditions that 
will allow the economy to function well.
That is the role of government. Its role is to ensure a “wise 
laisser faire”. This is not the free-for-all capitalism that has 
been recommended by the current economic theory, and 
seems to have been accepted as gospel by economic planners, 
and also many economists, since the Thatcher and Reagan 
governments. But it also is a significant middle way between 
those who see the economic disasters and unemployment 
of unfettered capitalism, on the one hand, and those who 
believe that the government should play no role at all.
The  idea  that  unfettered,  unregulated  capitalism  would 
invariably produce the good outcomes was a wrong economic 
theory regarding how capitalist societies behave and what 
causes their crises. That wrong economic theory fails to take 
account of how the animal spirits affect economic behaviour. 
It fails to take into account the roles of confidence, stories 
and snake oil in economic fluctuation.
The article can be found online on www.ft.com
© Copyright The Financial Times Ltd 2009.
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Miscellaneous
Change in Directorship
After six successful years at the manage-
ment  board  of  the  Gesellschaft  für 
Kapitalmarktforschung,  Volker  Wieland 
has  stepped  down  as  a  director  of  CFS. 
However, he will remain an active partner 
within  CFS,  serving  as  the  program  director  of  the  area 
“Central  Banking  and  Monetary  Economics”.  He  will  also 
continue to organize the ECB Watchers conference.
A  director  since  2003,  Volker  has  greatly  enhanced  the 
Monetary and Macro Group, and has contributed enormously 
to the strong stand of CFS in both academic and policy circles. 
Volker Wieland has been responsible for CFS’ flag ship event, 
the annual conference “The ECB and Its Watchers”, the 10th of 
which was held in the fall of 2008. Volker's work on monetary 
policy  has  been  discussed  and  his  publication  record  has 
been  outstanding.  As  a  director,  he  was  also  an  organizer 
of  the  International  Research  Forum  on  Monetary  Policy, 
an annual conference involving the Federal Reserve Board 
and  Georgetown  University  in  Washington,  as  well  as  the 
European Central Bank and CFS in Frankfurt. Furthermore, 
over  the  past  year,  Wieland  was  working  as  a  Duisenberg 
Fellow at the ECB.
“It was a great pleasure to work together with Volker, and we 
are very grateful for his important and lasting contributions 
to CFS management, and its academic profile. We welcome 
Volker in his old and new role as CFS Program Director in the 
area of Central Banking and Monetary Economics”, said Jan 
Krahnen. Appointment of the new CFS management team is 
under way.
CFS Executive Education
17-18 Sep 2009  Zinsprodukte: Analyse und Bewertung 
    (Teil I)
    Wolfgang Bühler (University Mannheim)
01-02 Oct 2009    Kreditderivate  und  deren  Bewertung.   
Ein Werkstattseminar zum Mitmachen
      Prof.  Dr.  Stefan  Reitz  (Hochschule  für 
Technik Stuttgart)
       
08-09 Oct 2009  Zinsprodukte: Analyse und Bewertung 
    (Teil II) 
      Prof. Dr. Wolfgang M. Schmidt (Frankfurt 
School of Finance & Management)
29-30 Oct 2009    Zukunftsgestaltung. Die Finanzbranche von 
morgen denken
    Stephan  Meyer  (denkstelle)  and  Axel   
    Liebetrau (PortaFinancia)
12-13 Nov 2009    Behavioral  Finance  und  der  Einfluss  von 
Stimmungen auf die Finanzmärkte
      Dr. Conrad Mattern (Conquest Investment 
Advisory AG)
    For further information and registration  
    please contact Anca Becheanu: 
    hof-trainings@ifk-cfs.de
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